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THE JESUITS GOSPEL,

According to

Saint Ignatius Loiola.

WHEREIN

Their Impious Doctrines againſt the Chriſtian Faith,

Their Pernitious Maxims againſt Chriſtian Princes,

AND

Their Unjuſt Practices deſtructive to all Humane Society,

Contrary to the SACRED SCRIPTURES, the LAWS of GOD, and Right Reaſon, are declared.

Veni gladium mittere non Pacem:
Sicut Serpentes.

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Printed for *Norman Nelſon*, at *Grays-Inn* Gate in *Holbourn*. MDC LXXIX.

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THE Jesuits Gospel, Acccording to Saint Ignatius Loiola.

CHAP. I.

Of the Pope.

1. THe Bishop of *Rome* is God. *Dist.96. Ca. satis evidenter.*

2. The Pope is no Man. *Lib. 1. Sext. de electione tit. 6. c. fundament. in glos.* It's true of Pope *Joan.*

3. The Pope is neither God nor Man. *In. Prolog. Clement in glossatore.*

4. It's lawful for no man to imagin or practise to transgress the Precepts of Apostolical See. *Dist.20. c. nulli Dist.12.22.*

5. An Heretick is he who is not obedient to the Pope's Decrees. *Ibidem.*

6. The Pope is Lord of all Temporalties upon Earth. *Lib. 3. Sext. tit. 16. c. Periculoso.*

7. No man ought to say unto the Pope, Why dost thou thus,or thus? *Decret. lib.7. c.5. glos.*

8. No mortal man may sit in Judgment upon the Pope. *Dist.40. c. si Papa. c. non omnes. glos.*

9. It's lawful for no Creature to call into question the Judgment of the Apostolical See, or delay the Sentence thereof. *Caus.17. q.4. c. memini.*

10. The Pope may dispense against the Apostles. *Dist. 34. Col. in glos. Dist.82. c. Presbyter in glos. Caus. 15. q.6. c. authoritatem in glos.*

11. The Pope hath Celestial arbitriment, *lib. 1. Decret. Greg. c. 5.*

12. The Pope's Will is a Law. *Ibidem.*

13. The Pope may cause an unjust Decree to be received for just. *Ibid.*

14. All Nations and Kingdoms are under the Pope's Jurisdiction. *Ext. Com. tit. 1. super gentes.*

15. God hath delivered over unto the Pope the power and rule of Heaven and Earth. *Ext. Jo. 22. tit.5. dist.22. c. omnes.*

16. The whole World is the Pope's right and inheritance; therefore if Emperours or Kings have at any time given any Privileges or Lands, to any Pope, (as they say *Constantine* did to *Sylvester*) they did not give that which was their own to give; but only restore that which was formerly taken from them by tyranny and injustice. *Aug. de Anconade potestate Ecclesiastica, part. 1. q. 1. ar. 1.*

17. The Pope is above all Principalities and Power, and every name that is named, not only in this World, but in that which is to come: and that he is the Sun and Light of the World. *B. 20. de Roman Pontific. ca. 6. p. 56, 57, 58, 66. Eph. 1.21.*

True of Pope *Clement* the 7th, when he was cooped up by *Charles* the 5th in the Caſtle of St. *Angelo*; then *Papa non poteſt errare.*

18. The Pope hath an Almighty Infallibility, and cannot err. *Sanch. Suarez. G. Valentia.*

CHAP. II.

Of the Papal Grandeur, or Greatneſs.

1. WHen the Emperour goeth to be crowned by the Pope, he, as ſoon as he eſpyeth his Holineſs, is to kneel and worſhip him bare-headed, then to approach nearer and kiſs his feet; and the ſame is to be done by the Empreſs when ſhe is crowned: *Sacrarum Ceremoniarum, lib.* 1. *fo.* 22. *edit. Rom.*

2. When the Emperour is crowned at the publique Proceſſion before the people, he is to go to the *Pope*'s Houſe, and then to hold the Stirrup till his Holineſs mounts on Horſeback; and then like a Lacquey muſt he hold the *Pope*'s *Roſinant* ſome wayes by the reins. *Ibidem, fo.* 25,26.

3. This piece of Service muſt the Emperour, King or Chief Potentate perform when the *Pope* is choſen, in his Proceſſion to the *Lateran* Church. *Ibidem.*

4. If there be two Kings preſent, then the *Pope* doth command the one of them on his right ſide, the other on his left muſt lead his Palfray along by the Bridle. *Ibid.* 17. And therefore when *Frederick Barbaroſſa* held the left Stirrup of his Holineſs as he alighted from his Horſe, his Holineſs Pope *Adrian* the Fourth took great diſpleaſure, becauſe he held the left Stirrup of his Saddle and not the right; which if he had intended to have honoured us, he would have held the right, which ought to have been holden. *Funcii Chronicon. Bar. de vita Pontific.*

5. The beſt Lay-man though he be Emperour or King, muſt carry Water for the *Pope* to waſh his hands in, and muſt carry up the firſt Diſh of meat to his Table. *Ibidem, fo.* 20.

6. If the *Pope* will not ride on Horſeback, but be carried in a Chair, then four of the greateſt Princes, yea though the Emperour be one of them, muſt put their Shoulders to the ſaid Chair, and ſo carry him ſome ſpace: *Ibidem, lib.* 1. *fo.* 17. By this all the Emperours, Kings and Princes of the Earth muſt learn to obey, fear and reverence him.

7. When his Holineſs is Elected and carried to the *Lateran*, he takes up as much Money as he can in his hand, and throws it amongſt the People, ſaying, *Silver and Gold have I none, but ſuch as I have, give I thee.* Ibid. fo. 17. Act. 36.

8. We muſt bow at the Name of the Virgin *Mary*, and of the Pope, as well as at the Name of Jeſus. *Par. Craſſus de Ceremoniis Card. & Epiſc. lib.* 1. *c.* 22.

9. Whoſoever obeyeth not the Command of the Pope, ſhall die the death. *Ribadeniera, lib.* 1. *de Principe, c.* 17. *p.* 108.

10. The Croſs hath precedence before the Eagles or Enſigns of the Empire; the Sword of *Peter* before that of *Conſtantine*; and the Apoſtolick Seat judgeth, and is above the Imperial power. *Baronius in Paræn.* p. 9.

11. That the Pope cannot be judged by any perſon; for it's written, That *the Spiritual perſon judgeth all things, but he himſelf is not judged,* 1 Cor. c. 7.

12. All the Princes of the Earth muſt do honour and reverence to the Pope as a great God. *Blondus lib.* 3. *Rom. inſtaurat.*

13. An appeal can be made from the Council to the Pope. *Johannes de Sylva de Beneficiis, part* 4. *p.* 4. *n.* 28. *T.* 15. *part* 1. *fo.* 109.

14. No appeal can be made from the Pope to the Council. *Jacobatius de Concil. ar.* 1. *n.* 36. *T.* 13. *part.* 1. *fo.* 352. 16. 26. *fo.* 270.

CHAP. III.

Of the Power of the Pope.

1. THE Pope can do all things that God himſelf can do, only ſin excepted. *Jacob. de Griffiis deciſ. aureæ. part.* 1. *c.* 31.

2. The Pope hath no limits or bounds in the whole World, but thoſe which it ſelf had. *Jacob. Fuligattus vitâ Card. Bellarm. lib.* 3. *c* 5.

3. He hath power of making ſin more ſin; and that which is no ſin, to be ſin. *Bellar. contra Barclaſum, c.* 31.

4. The Pope can give Empires and Kingdoms to whom he pleaſeth, and depoſe the poſſeſſors of them. *Jul. Ferrettus de re & diſcip. militari, p.* 516. *Celſus Mancinus de juribus Principum, lib.* 3. *c.* 3. *p.* 76. *Greg. de Valentia, To.* 3. *diſp.* 1. 4. 12. *punct.* 2. *col.* 439. 443.

5. The Pope may depoſe Kings by his power, if they be either negligent in the adminiſtration of their Government, or do not extirpate all Hereticks out of their Dominions. *Hoſtien. Sum. lib.* 5. *tit. de Hæretic.* 8. *quæ pœna. S.* 11. *Johannes de Tuzz. Cremala ſum. de eccleſ. c.* 14. *propoſ.* 44. *Panormitanus, lib.* 5. *Decret. de Hæretic. c.* 13.

6. If a King turns Heretick, he hath no right to his Kingdom, and ſo no man ought to think it ſtrange if the Pope depoſe him. *Dom. à Soto. in* 4. *ſentent. diſt.* 25. *q.* 2. *a.* 1. *n* 3. *Alphonſ. à Caſtro de juſta hereticorum punitione. lib.* 2. *c.* 7. *col.* 12. 45. 1246.

7. If Kings will not be obedient to the Church, then may the Pope by his great power from Heaven very juſtly turn them from all their Royalties and Government; and the Subjects themſelves, if the Pope bid them, muſt take up Arms againſt them. *Gre. Nunnius Coronel. de vera Chriſti Eccles. lib.* 9. *p.* 345.

8. The Pope can quit Subjects from the Obedience and Allegiance which they owe to their Kings. *Joh. Maria Bellettus diſq. clerical. part.* 1. *p.* 282. *p.* 109. *Panormitan. in Decret. de Hæreticis. c.* 13.

9. If the King doth tyrannize, and doth not execute his Office duly, or when there is any other juſt cauſe for ſo doing, then the people may dethrone him, and elect another. *Em. Sa. Aphoriſ.* 5. *principis.* 9. 2. *Molina de juſt. tom.* 1. *Tract.* 2. *diſp* 9. *col.* 213, 214. *Jacob. Simonica de Cathol. Inſt.* 7. 9. §. 257.

10. The Pope may make an Ordinance contrary to the Epiſtle of St. *Paul. Char. Ruinus Conſ.* 109. *n.* 1. *Vol.* 5.

11. The power of the Pope is greater than that of the Apoſtles, having power to derogate from the ſayings and words of the Apoſtle. The Deciſ. of the *Rota* at *Rome. Deciſ.* 1. *n.* 3. *Antonius Maria in addit. ad deciſ. novas, n.* 9.

12. The Doctrine of the Pope is the infallible rule of Faith, and the Holy Scripture hath taken its force, and doth take it from his Holineſs; and he that doth not believe this is an Heretick. *Silveſter Prieras in epitom. reſp. ad Luther. c.* 7. *To.* 1.

13. The Pope is he by whom Kings reign, according to that which is ſaid, *By me Kings reign. Fr. Boſius de temporal. Eccles. Monarchia. lib.* 1. *ca.* 3. 11. And therefore *Henry* the Fourth Emperour, being excommunicated by Pope *Gregory* the *7th*, he puts off his Royal and Imperial Habiliments with his Wife and young Son bare-footed and clothed in Canvas (being made a Spectacle to Angels and Men to admire at) in a moſt bitter Winter, and moſt dangerous kind of Travel, cometh to *Canaſium*, where the Pope then reſided; Faſting and Suiter like from Morning till Evening he danceth attendance; for three dayes he patiently endureth this lamentable affliction, being often told his Holineſs was not at leiſure to attend his Suit, and denyed admittance; but after great importunities and ſolicitations, and giving Oath and ſecurity for his good behaviour for the future, he

is

is absolved. *Nauclerus, p. 36. Urspergensis, Platina in vita Grego.* 7. By this the Power and Supremacy of the Pope is to be seen over Emperours and Kings.

14. The Pope may do, what God doth. *Decret. de Major. et obedient. c. solicit. 6.*

CHAP. IV.

Religion, Prayer, Faith, Charity.

IT's in the Precept of Prayer, as in that of Faith, Hope, and Charity, there is no certain time wherein this Precept obligeth directly; but only indirectly, to wit, When its necessary to acquire some good, or to remove some evil. He that prayes not to God in a temptation against chastity, sins only against chastity; for he sins not in omitting prayer, but because of the danger he is in to violate chastity. *Tamber. decal. c. 4. sect. 2. n. 5.*

So that we are not at any time obliged directly to pray unto God any more than to love him, believe, or trust in him; but indirectly, and as it were by accident, when we have need, as in a temptation, or the like.

2. In our private prayers which we make to God, it's not necessary to use any attention; nor are we obliged to attend: for this obligation goes no further than to venial sin; and those prayers which are made by command, in that case none is obliged upon pain of mortal sin, to an inward attention in saying his Office, provided he rehearse it outwardly and entirely. *Fliut. Mor. q. q. Tom. 2. tr. 23. c. 8. n. 252.*

3. Whatsoever distraction or evil thoughts there are in the mind of Man in Prayer, and when he rehearses the Divine Office, though it be voluntary, if it comes of negligence and not of contempt, it's but a venial sin: when it comes from a formal and deliberate contempt, yet we fail not in satisfying the Church, and discharging our Duty. *Escobar. tr. 5. exam. 6. n. 157. p. 679.* For it's not necessary to satisfie the command of the Church, to have any inward attention; but it's sufficient to give some outward respect, and behave ones self decently. *Coninck 3. part q 83. art. 68. 247. n. 286. n. 301. p. 286.* The outward act of prayer, which is done with the outward circumstances which it ought to have, is a true exterior action of the virtue of Religion, though it be done with voluntary distraction, which is it self a sin. *Coninck, ibidem.* For the outward adoration which is rendred to an Idol, is a true and outward act of adoration, and of idolatry; though he who makes this adoration outwardly, hath no intention to adore the Idol. *Banny in his Sum. ch. 13. p. 176.* So we must believe that they pray who recite the Office, though without intention, yet not without exterior decency and composure such as the action requires. *Banny. ibidem.*

God Commands one thing, and a Tyrant another; we must obey the Tyrant rather than God.

4. Christ commands us to receive Baptism, a Tyrant forbids us to receive it, upon pain of our lives; we are obliged not to receive it. *Escob. lib. 1. Theol. mor. sect. 2. c 7. problem. 29.*

5. In receiving the Sacrament of the Lord's Supper, it's not necessary to have actual devotion; for he who is voluntarily distracted in the receiving the Sacrament, provided he contemns it not, puts no obstacle to the effect of the Communion, because he sins not mortally. *Fillut. Tom. 1. mor. q q. tr. 4. chap. 6. n. 163, 164. p. 87.*

6. If actual sin be committed in the very Communion it self, it hinders not at all from the receiving the grace of the communion; because this Sin makes not the person unworthy of the participation of the Body and Blood of *Jesus Christ*; for there is nothing but mortal sin that is capable of causing this Unworthiness. *Fillut. ibidem.*

7. He who hath sinned mortally, and hath remorse for his sins, and hath confessed them, may absolutely communicate, though the very night before, or even a little

a little before the Communion, he hath ſinned mortally. *Filut. tr.4. c.8. n.224.*

8. If a man after he hath communicated many times in a bad ſtate, cometh to be converted, he ſhall receive in an inſtant all the graces which were due to ſo many Communions, though they were received in an unworthy manner. *Maſcarenhas. tr.1. de Sacr. in gen. diſp.4. c.5. n.211.* From this admirable doctrine it followeth, That a man may become moſt holy in an inſtant, and will ſurpaſs in holineſs, many of thoſe who have lived in innocency, when he was plunged in Sin; and the greater and more ſins he hath committed, the more holy he is.

9. It's not neceſſary that the Prieſt who finds himſelf guilty of mortal ſin, ſhould confeſs himſelf before he adminiſters the Sacrament. *Diſcaſt.tr.2. de Sacr. d.3. d.10. n.200.*

10. The Prieſt may adminiſter the Sacrament to one who ſinneth publickly, provided that he doth not receive it publickly through contempt of the Sacrament or of Religion, but for ſome other end; and that he threaten the Prieſt with death or loſs of reputation, or to do ſome great wrong to him in his goods; and this is rather to permit ſin in another for ſome juſt cauſe, than to co-operate therewith. *Eſcob. lib.4. Theol. Mor. c.3.*

11. In extream neceſſity we are obliged to do alms of ſuch things as are not neceſſary unto life, though they be needful to ſupport us in our condition. *Eſcob. tr.5. Exam.5. n.43. p.632.* By *Extream Neceſſity*, we muſt underſtand that on which the life of man depends; ſo that if he be not aſſiſted, he will ſurely dye: in this caſe we are obliged to give that which is ſuperfluous.

12. A perſon who hath abundance, after he hath ſatisfied all his own neceſſaries, and thoſe of his own family, having yet a ſuperfluity, is not obliged in a public Famine to give unto the Poor, nor to any one whomſoever, if he ſee him not in eminent danger to die with famine. *Eſcob. tr.5. exam.5. n.47. p.633.*

13. We are not obliged to aſſiſt or give alms unto the poor with any notable diminution of our wealth, honour or life. *Tolet. lib.4. Inſt. Sacerd. c.10. n.5. p.635.*

14. We may fulfill the Precept of Alms, by lending only, without giving any thing. *Tolet. lib.8. c.85. n.2. p.1242.* And that unleſs in extream neceſſity, (in evident danger of death) Alms are not commanded under mortal ſin. *Ibid.* And in that caſe we are not obliged any further to provide for them, if we have not Wealth to ſpare, and Riches which are ſuperfluous; which very few perſons believe they have, becauſe Covetouſneſs and Ambition make all men in a manner neceſſitous: ſo that it's clear by the doctrine of theſe Doctors, the Rich are not obliged to give Alms, but out of their ſuperfluity; and not then, but in caſe of great neceſſity. Thoſe things which may exalt us unto a better condition, as Honour, Preferment or Places, are not to be accounted ſuperfluous. *Granad.22. controver.4. d.2. lib.4. n.18.* So that rarely it happens that we can have ſuperfluous goods; and ſo by conſequence we muſt rarely give alms. *Tamb. lib 5. decal. c.1. ſect.1. n.14.*

15. Amongſt Chriſtians there are few who are damned for failing to exerciſe the works of corporal mercy, none being obliged thereunto under mortal ſin, unleſs in the utmoſt and greateſt neceſſity of his Neighbour, which happens very rarely, ſo as to impoſe any great obligation on any particular perſon. *Leſs. lib.13. de perfect. divin. v.22. n.142.* And though we are not to give Alms, but in the greateſt neceſſity, yet when that happens, no perſon is particularly obliged to provide againſt it; becauſe the obligation is to aſſiſt our Neighbour in general to all thoſe who have means to do it, but none in particular; ſo that a poor man may die of hunger in the view of many perſons who may and ought to aſſiſt him, while they expect and attend one another, none being bound in particular to ſatisfie an obligation which is in common to them all.

16. It's certain, there is no obligation to love our Neighbour by any intern al act of the Will, expreſly terminated in him; whence it is, if you hate him not, and for his ſake obſerve the outward works of good will, you love him ſufficiently. *Suarez. c.5. d.1. lib.4. n.4. Filut. Tom.2. mor. q.q. tr. 22. c.9. n.283. p.92.* Of 32 Parables, which is the moſt frequent manner of Chriſt's diſcourſe, he applyes but one for the recommendation of the love of our Neighbour, in the perſon of the diſtreſſed poor man abuſed by Thieves betwixt *Jericho* and *Jeruſalem. Sermond. tr. 2. p.121.*

ide contr. oh. 13.34. o. c. 15. v. 2, 17. Mar. 22. v. 40.

It's no mortal ſin to have ſuch a hatred againſt our Neighbour, as not to be willing to keep company with him, to have ſuch and ſo violent an averſion from him, as upon no terms or occaſion to be willing to ſpeak with him, nor help him in his buſineſs, nor at all to forgive him, when he acknowledgeth his fault, and offers ſatisfaction. *Bauny's Sum. p.81.*

17. There is no abſolute Commandment to love God, becauſe every Command carries ſome threatning with it to keep them in their duty to whom it is made, and then ſome penalty or puniſhment againſt thoſe who violate it; now the Commandment which God gave us to love him, contains neither threat nor puniſhment, and ſo by conſequence it's no Commandment truly ſo called. *Sermond* in his Defence of Virtue, *Tr. 2. p.28.* God commanding us to love him, contents himſelf that we ſhould obey him in his other Commandments: for God hath not obliged us abſolutely to teſtifie our affections to him, otherwiſe than by yielding obedience to him. *Ibid. p.11.* And God hath not commanded us ſo much to love, as not to hate him. *Ibid. p.19.* And all thoſe which in Scripture are vulgarly called Commands to love God, they are Advices and Counſels, but not Commands. *Ibidem, p.20,21.* God ought to be content that we love him a little as we pleaſe, becauſe to love him more, and to a certain degree, is only an Advice; it ſufficeth that we love him much under what we could, if we would; becauſe the leaſt degree of love, is enough for him, and to ſatisfie the Commandment. *Amic. Tom.4. d. 23. ſect.2. n. 21,22,19.*

Whereas it's ſaid we muſt love God above all things; we muſt not extend theſe words (*All things*) to the rigour in its utmoſt extent, and according to its natural ſence, ſo as it comprehend under it all Creatures, but that we muſt underſtand (by *all things*) only thoſe which are evil, contrary to God, and which deſtroy the friendſhip we have with him by Grace; (that is to ſay) mortal ſin only. *Amic. Tom. 4. diſp. 29. ſect. 2. n.16.*

And if we be obliged to love God, we are not obliged to love him above three or four moments in our life, whereof the firſt is when we begin to have the uſe of Reaſon; Secondly, at the point of death. Thirdly, every fifth year during life. *Filut. Tom.2. mor. qq. tr.22. c.9. n.286,290. p.93.* The reſt of our time we may love God or the World as we pleaſe.

18. If a man hath committed any mortal ſin, he is not obliged to contrition and ſorrow for the ſin before the article of his death. *Filut. Tom.1, qq. mor. tr.6. c.8. n.198,199,157.* So that (according to this doctrine) who is in mortal ſin, may with a ſafe Conſcience perſiſt voluntarily all his life in a ſtate of enmity and averſion to God, and delay his Converſion until the point of death, demanding only forgiveneſs of God, when he is ready to die and can offend him no longer.

19. If a man being at the point of death, endeavours to do what he can, and having in his mind only an act of attrition preſent, he ſaith unto God theſe words, *Lord have mercy on me*, with deſign to pacifie him, he ſhall be juſtified, God himſelf ſupplying the want of abſolution. *Eſcob. tr.7. Exam. 4. n.122. p. 819.*

20. Faith and Charity are not ſuch ſupernatural Graces and Vertues as the World takes them to be; for a man may be a Martyr and merit the Crown of Martyrdom, not only without any act of Charity, but alſo without any act of Faith;

Faith; and though he ſuffers without love to God, and though he never thinks of him, it's ſufficient that he be killed out of hatred to the Faith, though he have not ſo much as a thought of confeſſing it; as it happens in a ſuddain eruption of *Barbarians*, one is killed in his ſleep through hatred of Faith. *Connick* 3. *par. q.* 66. *de baptiſ. a.* 12. *n.*136. *p.*8. *Celot. lib.*3. *c.*3. *p.*125.

21. It matters not, if death had been propoſed to this man, the fear it would have brought on him, would poſſibly have forced him to forget God; yet becauſe this conditional ſuppoſition produces no real thing in the man, it cannot hurt him. *Connick* 3. *par. q.* 66. *de baptiſ. p.*139. So then to be a Martyr, it's not at all neceſſary to have ſo much as a conditional will to die for God, if occaſions were preſented, that the contrary diſpoſition, rather to forſake God than loſe his life on this occaſion, cannot hurt him; and by conſequence it's not bad, nor hinders a man from being in a ſtate to receive a Crown of Martyrdom, if he die without ever thinking of it in this diſpoſition by the hand of a Tyrant.

22. He who outwardly recites the Office of the Church, doth perform the duty of Prayer, though he doth it without any inward intention or devotion, ſo as the outward appearance and Precept be obſerved, which ſuch an action requires; for the outward action wherewith we attend on God, is of the ſame nature, and appertains to the virtue of Religion. *Bauny in his ſum. c.* 20. *p.*335. And the duty of prayer is ſatisfied though there be no intention. *Eſcob. tr.* 5. *exam.* 6. *c.*13. *n.*136. *p.*677. For he that doth in ſubſtance, that is to ſay, outwardly, that which is commanded, ſatisfies truly the Commandment of the Church, though he hath no will to accompliſh it, but rather the contrary. *Layman. lib.*1. *tr.*4. *c.*4. *n.*6. *p.*49.

23. The Bleſſed Virgin is more eaſie intreated than Jeſus Chriſt, therefore her protection is more aſſiſting and helpful to us. *Fr. de Mendoza virid. lib.* 2. *probl.* 2.

24. There is as great efficacy, as to Salvation, in the Virgin *Mary*'s Milk, as in our Saviour's Blood. *Andr. Rivet. Apol. lib.*2. *c.*5. *p.*248. *Idem, lib.*1. *c.*19. *p.*155. *Idem, Jeſuita vapul. c.*14,15. *p.*3,307,808.

25. A man may be ſaved without ever loving God in all his life. *Let. Provinc.* 11. *p.*160.

26. It's lawful to conſult a Conjurer. *Addit. myſter. Jeſuit. p.* 111. And that an expert Conjurer in diabolical arts is well worthy a reward. *Let. Provinci. p.*116. And a Fortune-teller is not obliged to reſtitution, if he hath conſulted the Devil. *Addit. p.* 20. §. 19.

CHAP. V.

Of Sin.

1. HE that from the impreſſion of an inveterate cuſtom, as it were, dy a ſort of impetuous neceſſity, is tranſported to do evil, as to ſpeak words of Blaſphemy, ſins not at all; becauſe a man cannot ſin without rational knowledg and deliberation. *Layman, lib.*1. *tr.*2. *c.*3. *n.*6. *p.*20. An evil cuſtom takes away the uſe of reaſon, and ſo by conſequence it doth not augment but diminiſh ſin; nay, ſometimes it takes it away; ſo that man who hath theſe evil habits, is in a better condition than he that hath them not: and by often ſinning, is put into a condition or ſtate of not ſinning any more.

2. Perjury, which one commits through natural inadvertency, or becauſe of the cuſtom he hath to ſwear, is no mortal ſin, though he who doth it, hath his will effectually addicted to ſin by an evil habit. *Filut. Mor. Tom.*2 *tr.*25. *c.*1. *n.*27. *p.*173. By this admirable doctrine, although a man perjure himſelf, he having not a full knowledg, or tranſported with ſome violent habit, it's no mortal ſin in him.

3. If

3. If a man cuſtomarily curſe his Horſe, Dogs, Hawks, or other Creatures, which are without reaſon, ſetting aſide choler by which he ſuffers himſelf to be tranſported, it's no ſin at all; becauſe this evil cuſtom is become natural, and makes him do it without any paſſion, and even ſo as he perceives it not, therefore he commits no ſin, in the moſt ſtrange curſes and execrations. *Bauny's ſum. c.6. p.73. c.5. p.66.*

4. Thoſe who in their Youth, have committed many actions of a vitious nature, which they did not believe to be ſuch, are not obliged to confeſs one word of them, when they know and underſtand their nature. *Bauny in his ſum. c.* 40. *p.* 650,651. Becauſe when they were committed, they had not the full uſe of reaſon, and knowledg, and at moſt they were but venial ſins, if any ſin at all.

5. If any one ſhoots an Arrow by which he hits his enemy, ſuppoſing invincibly that it was a Beaſt, he is altogether innocent of this man's ſlaughter, though he was in ſuch a diſpoſition, that if he had known that it had been his Enemy, he would have killed him with more joy. *Sanch. op. mor. lib.*1. *c.*16. *n.*13. *p.*70.

6. The pleaſure which is taken in an action of mortal ſin, which is done in ſleep, drunkenneſs, madneſs or through ignorance, is no ſin. *Filut. Mor. Tom.*2: *tr.*21. *c.*8. *n.*290. *p.*26. Ignorance is a great *Aſylum* for innocency, for it doth not only protect men from the greateſt ſins, but it giveth them liberty and power to rejoyce and take pleaſure in them as good actions, when one comes to know them or call them to remembrance.

7. He who knows that it is a mortal ſin to commit an action, but knows not that it is a ſin to command another to commit it, through invincible ignorance, is excuſed from ſin in doing it. *Sanch. op. mor. lib.*1. *c.*16. *n.*19. Therefore if a Peaſant ſhould hear it ſpoken by a man reputed to be Pious and Knowing, that it was a ſin to ſteal, and commit fornication outwardly, but that it was lawful to deſire the one or the other, in this caſe the interior act is exempt from all ſin, becauſe of invincible ignorance. *Ibidem.*

8. To ſin mortally, it's not enough to ſee the evil that is done, and the danger incurred in doing, but he ought to have a full and perfect knowledg, and beſides this, both time and means to deliberate on it; therefore ſuch actions which are committed out of ignorance, evil habits, or paſſion, are not mortal ſins; it's not enough to commit a mortal ſin, to conſider and to will with deliberation the evil that is done, but this conſideration and deliberation muſt be full. *Sanch. op. mor. lib.*1. *c.* 16. *n.*21. Therefore when there occur in one and the ſame action two ſorts of different wickedneſs, it's not ſufficient to perceive one, to make him guilty of both, but we muſt have or be obliged to have an actual knowledg of the other; Therefore when a man lyes with a woman whom he knowes to be not his Wife, but is invincibly ignorant that ſhe is his Kinſwoman, he is guilty of Fornication, but not of Inceſt. *Sanch. op. mor. lib.*1. *c.*1. *n.*8. *p.*2,70. *Amic. Tom.* 3. *d.* 17. *ſ.* 8. *n.*172. *p.*205. *Eſcob. tr.* 2. *Exam.*1. *c.* 3. *n.* 8. *p.* 275.

9. He who doth ſome unlawful act, knowing well that it's forbidden, but not remembring it to be ſuch when he doth it, is exempt from mortal ſin; becauſe forgetfulneſs or negligence which is the cauſe we think not of it, the evil we are about to do, is not imputed for ſin, if it be not voluntary: and it's not voluntary, if we bethink us not to conſider that we are obliged to examin what we are about to do. *Layman. lib.*1. *tr.* 12. *c.*4. *n.*6. *p.* 20.

10. To ſin, it's not ſufficient to do the evil that is forbidden, or not to do that which is commanded by the Law of God, Nature or the Church; but it's neceſſary to have a knowledg of the evil that we do, and an intention to do it: By this rule we are free from the greateſt ſins, ſo we have a good intention in committing of them, or that we have no evil intention: we may wiſh evil or death to our Neighbour, without ſin, when we are induced thereunto by ſome

good

good motive, as that he is given to ſuing; or that he is a perſon of good reputation for his well living, and therefore doth eclipſe our credit. *Bauny's ſum. c. 6. p. 73.*

11. He who doth maintain an Heretical Propoſition without believing it, or who ſhall be a Communicant or Auditor amongſt Proteſtants without having his Heart there, but out of pure deriſion, or to comply with the Times, and to accompliſh his deſigns, he ought not to be eſteemed a Proteſtant therefore; becauſe his underſtanding is not infected with their errors. *Bonacina. d. 3. q. 4. n. 7.*

12. He who hath knowledg of the Law, and is ignorant of the penalty which it ordains againſt thoſe who violate it, doth not incur the penalty which he is to undergo if he obey not. *Tambur. Decal, lib. 1. c. 2. ſect. 10. n. 12.*

By this maxim, he that doth not know that Hell is the puniſhment of mortal Sin, ſhall not be in danger of going thither.

13. God cannot command or forbid a matter that is in it ſelf ſlight under the penalty of mortal ſin. *Em. Sa. verb. Præcept. n. 1. p. 575. Amic. Tom. 5. a. 5. de lege humana. ſ. 8. n. 194. p. 64.*

14. He that hath a will to commit all venial ſins if he were able, ſins only venially. *Eſcob. tr. 2. exam. 1. c. 12. n. 57. p. 385.*

15. To make an action evil and unlawful, is required firſt to make it appear, that the reaſons which prove the malice of the action be demonſtrative; that is, that they be ſuch as whereunto no probable anſwer can be given. Secondly, that the reaſons which prove this ſame action to be good and lawful, be not ſo much as probable. Thirdly, that the Opinions which maintain that this action is good, hath not ſufficient authority to be held probable; all theſe muſt be obſerved, otherwiſe the action is not evil. *Caram. fund. p. 138.*

16. To tell a lye in Preaching on any doctrinal Point, is but a venial ſin. *Eſcobar. tr. 7. exam. 4. n. 107. p. 816.*

17. To perform the moſt ſacred actions, as to adminiſter the Sacraments, or to receive them, or to celebrate the Maſs for vain-glory, is but a venial ſin, though vain-glory be propoſed as the principal end. *Sanch. op. mor. lib. 1. c. 3. n. 1. p. 9.*

18. When a ſlight thing is commanded, the commandment obliges not unto mortal ſin, although that be the intention of him who commands. *Em. Sa. verb. præcept. n. 1. p. 575.*

19. The greatneſs of the ſin ought to be eſtimated from, and according to its matter and ſubject. *Eſcobar. Sanch.*

20. No perſon is obliged to avoid the next occaſion of ſin, when thereby ſome great loſs will befall him; in this caſe it cannot be ſaid that he wills this occaſion, but permits it only; becauſe that he withdraws not from this occaſion, is not that he would abſolutely abide in it, but becauſe he would decline the damage which this withdrawing would bring on him. *Sanch. in ſelect. diſp. 10. n. 20.* For this reaſon a man is not obliged to put away his Concubine, if her company be very advantagious to him, and in departing with her he loſe any great benefit.

21. A thing is not the next occaſion of ſin, unleſs it be vitious and a ſin of it ſelf. *Bauny's Theol. mor. par. 1. lib. 4. de pœnit. q. 14. p. 94.*

22. To ſell a Woman paint, which he knowes ſhe will uſe to draw young men to unchaſt love, it's lawful; otherwiſe he would loſe a Cuſtomer, and ſuffer loſs and damage: So to build the Temple of an Idol, or to ſell an Idol it ſelf, or to ſell an Infidel a Lamb, which he knew he would uſe in Sacrifice to an Idol, is no ſin. *Tamb. lib. 5. decal. c. 1. ſ. 4. n. 38, 34, 35, 36.*

23. All the breaches of the firſt and ſecond Table of the Decalogue are no ſins at all, when they are committed by any out of ignorance, ſurpriſe or paſſion. *Myſt. of Jeſuit. add. p. 125. London. 1658.*

24. It's no ſin to contract a Marriage by perſonation, as if it were in a Play

upon the Stage, by using equivocal expressions in the Church, when one is forced thereunto by great fear. *Add. Myst. of Jesuitism, p.* 45. §. 24.

So that you may learn how comfortable and holy these Sacred Doctrines of the Jesuits are, and how far their Gospel doth exceed that of Jesus Christ; for he hath made the way to Heaven so narrow, and the Gate so streight, that few can enter in; whereas by the indulgence of these holy Fathers the way to Heaven is made so broad, that the people may safely go thither without jostling one another, and may with less pains go to Heaven than to Hell; and indeed let men do what they will, they cannot (according to their pious doctrines) go to Hell; for none go thither but for mortal sins: and how difficult a thing it is to sin mortally, you may observe by what hath been delivered unto you; and in case they go to Hell, these great and learned Doctors have a holy knack, and mysterious exorcism to fetch them out.

CHAP. VI.

Of Directing the Intention of good and bad Intentions.

1. TO do evil, there must be an evil intention; but to do good, it's not necessary to have a good intention. The Commands of God and the Church may be satisfied by an outward execution of what they ordain, though it be done without intention to fulfil them, or with an evil intent; and contrary to the Commandment, and even with an express intention not to fulfil it, and on the contrary, to render a man guilty of having violated the Commands of God, and the Church, it's not sufficient to violate them, but it's required to have thereof a formed design and express intention.

2. Ecclesiasticks satisfie the Precept of the Church in saying Prayers, when they sing or read them, though they do it without any inward intention or devotion; provided they observe outward modesty and decency: nay the Precept is satisfied, though the intention be express and formal not to satisfie it. *Bauny's sum. ch.*20. *p.*335. *Escob. tr.*5. *exam.*6. *c.*13. *n.*136. *p.*677. So that the outward appearance is more necessary to Prayer, and to the actions of Religion, then the inward motions of Piety, because they can subsist without this inward motion, but not without external shew: and we may perform the duty of Prayer, though we have a formal design not to obey the Church, and to despise its Commandement.

If a man fast for vain-glory, or to content his sensuality in eating and drinking Wine; and so act contrary to the intent of the Church, yet he doth not violate her Commands; for he that doth in substance, that is to say, outwardly, that which is commanded, satisfies truly the Commandement, though he hath no will to accomplish it, but rather contrary. *Laym. lib.*1. *tr.*4. *c.*4. *n.*6. *p.* 49.

3. If a man hears a Sermon, or be present at the Divine Office of the Church, a bad intent thereunto joyned, as an intent of looking on a Woman dishonestly, is not contrary to the commandements of the Church, neither doth he therein sin, but fulfil the Precept of hearing Prayers. *Fillut. mor. qq. Tom.*2. *tr.* 5. *c.*7. *n.*2,12. *p.* 128.

4. If a man speak never so dishonourably and irreverently of God, it's no Blasphemy, if he had not a formal intent to blaspheme God and dishonour him. *Bauny's sum. c.*5. *p.* 66. *Bonacina. d.*3. *q.*8. *p.*2. *n.* 2.

5. No man is responsible for the evil effects which are adherent to any action, except he formerly intend and procure them; therefore though a Woman knowes that a man loves her dishonestly, she sins not, how often soever she presents her self before him, and in his view, so as she hath not an intent to stir up the dishonest love which he hath towards her. *Fillut. To.* 2. *tr.*28. *c.*10. *n.* 232. because he that loves her dishonestly, doth rather take this occasion of offence from

from his own malice, then ſhe gives it him by the uſe of her own right and liberty.

6. If a man be to do an act, and makes proteſtation that his intention is not to do any evil; let the act be never ſo wicked, it's no ſin in him. *Bauny's ſum. c.14. p.219.* Therefore to kill an Heretick, if your intention be to propagate the *Roman* Catholique Faith it's no ſin; and an Uſurer who giveth his Money to intereſt to make profit thereof, may deliver himſelf from Uſury and Reſtitution, with proteſtation that it's not in his intention to make any uſurious contract, but to lend it him for his good, and that he would do nothing therein againſt God and his Conſcience. *Bauny. ibidem.*

7. A Mother which deſires the death of her Daughters for want of Beauty or Portions, becauſe ſhe cannot make them according to her deſire, or becauſe perhaps by occaſion of them, ſhe is ill treated by her Husband; this good intention of the Mother is ſufficient to excuſe the Mother from all ſin, who deſires the death of the daughters. *Bonacina. d.3. q.4. n.7.*

8. If a Servant by the command of his Maſter goes and tells a Woman with whom he knowes his Maſter intends to commit Adultery, that his Maſter will be found at home ſuch an hour; or if by the command of his Maſter he followes a Damoſel to ſee and enquire where ſhe lodges, if by his command he doth not only open the door, but ſhew her where his Maſter is, if he aid his Maſter to get up by the Window to enter the houſe where he is to commit the ſin, the Servant by directing his intention, may free himſelf of any ſuch or the like ſin, by intending that he did it for ſome good end, as for the juſt reward which he expected, or for fear of the loſs of his Maſter's favour, or ſome other damage: and proteſting that he is not pleaſed with this ſin of his Maſter. *Tamb. lib. 5. decal. c. 1. ſect.4. n.30.*

9. You may deſire the death of an Enemy who might do you much hurt, not of hatred to him, but to avoid the damage and hurt which he would do you; you may alſo rejoyce in his death, becauſe of the good which you receive thereby. *Em. Sa. verb. charitat. n. 8. p.65.* And all this may be done without ſin, by that excellent Science of directing the Intention.

10. To lye with a Woman (by the rule of directing the Intention) whom he repreſenteth to himſelf as under a condition, and as if he were married to her, is a thing which is not ill, and which on the contrary is good. *Sanch. op. mor. lib. 1. c.2. n.34. p.9. Fillut. mor. Tom.2. tr.21. c.8. n.269. p.27.*

11. It's lawful for perſons of all qualities, conditions and ſexes, to go to the the Stewes or places of common proſtitution, (intending to convert Women) though it be very probable (as frequently before) they will there commit ſins themſelves. *Myſt. of Jeſuitiſm. p.146, 147.*

12. If any man hath done me an injury or wrong, I may purſue him, not with an intention to be revenged of him, or to render evil for evil, but out of an intention to preſerve my honour. *Reginaldus in praxi. lib.21. n.62. p.260.* There is no more to be done, than to divert the Intention from the deſire of Revenge, which is ſinful, to incline it to a deſire of maintaining our honour, which is allowable; and by this means you may acquit your ſelf of all obligation both towards God, and towards Man, for you ſatisfie the World by permitting the action, and ſatisfy the Goſpel by purifying the intention.

13. A man may accept of a Challenge and fight a Duel in maintenance of his honour; and come to the place appointed, not with an expreſs intention to fight the Duel, but only with that of defending himſelf, if he, by whom he was challenged, comes unjuſtly to ſet upon him; for what hurt can there be for a man to go into the Field to walk there, in expectation of another, and to defend himſelf if any one ſets upon him? it's no ſin at all; for when the intention is directed to other circumſtances, the Challenge is not at all accepted; for the acceptation

ceptation of a Challenge consists in the express intention of fighting, which such a man hath not. *Provincial Letter.* 7.

14. In the *Indies* in *China*, they allow their proselyte Christians to commit Idolatry by this craft, *viz.* that of enjoyning them, to hide under their cloaths an Image of Jesus Christ, to which they teach them by a mental reservation to direct those publick adorations, which they render the Idol. *Cachins. Choan. Sucum. Myster. of Jesuit. lib.* 5. *p.* 53,54.

CHAP. VII.

Of Adultery, Fornication.

1. VIrgins have power to dispose of their Virginity without the consent of Parents; for when that is done with the consent of the Maid, though the Father hath just cause to be troubled at it, yet neither she, nor the person to whom she hath prostituted her self, hath done him any injury, nor as to what concerns him, violated any Law; for the Maid is in possession of her Virginity as well as of her body, she may dispose of it, as she pleaseth, and to whom she pleaseth, death or mutilation of member only excepted. *Bauny's Sum. p.* 148.

2. It's no sin to let a House to a Whore, though he knows she will abuse his House to sin; because he let his House to lodg in, and not to prostitute her self therein. *Molina de Inst. & Jur. To.* 2. *tr.* 2. *disp.* 500. *p.* 1122. *Gre. Valentia. Tom.* 3. *d.* 5. *q.* 21. *Escob. tr.* 3. *Exam.* 9. *c.* 4. *n.* 28. 8,9. *p.* 155.

3. To lye with a married Woman is not Adultery, if the Husband doth consent thereunto. *Addit. to the Myst. of Jesuit. p.* 110. §. 3.

4. If a Woman presents her self to the view of a man whom she knows to love her dishonestly, doth not commit any mortal sin, because she is not obliged to deprive her self of the liberty of standing at a Dore or a Window, or to walk forth into the Town. *Sanch. op. mor. lib.* 1. *c.* 6. *n.* 16 *p.* 19.

5. To lye with a Woman considered as ones Wife, is no sin; for the pleasure that the Will takes in a thing which is represented to it as good, is no mortal sin. *Escob. tr.* 3. *Exam.* 9. *c.* 4. *n.* 28. Therefore the Will may without mortal sin, not only desire this action, considered in this manner, but may regard it simply with pleasure. *Sanch. op. mor. lib.* 1. *c.* 2. *n.* 34. *p.* 9. *Filut. mor. Tom.* 2. *tr.* 21. *c.* 8. *n.* 269. *p.* 27.

6. An Ecclesiastick is not faulty who procures an abortion, if he doubts whether the fruit of the Womb were quick. *Myst. Jesuitis. addit. p.* 93. §. 13.

7. That which one receiveth for being a Pander to a debauched person, or for committing of Fornication, he is not bound to any restitution, but may conscionably be detained, if the fact be already done. *Filut. mor.* 22. *Tom.* 2. *tr.* 32. *c.* 4. *n.* 103. *p.* 364.

8. If a drunken or mad-man lyeth with a Woman, it is no mortal sin, because there was no use of reason, and the action without liberty, and therefore indifferent as the coupling of Beasts. *Filut. mor. tr.* 21. *c.* 5. *n.* 290. *p.* 34.

9. If a Peasant hath heard it said by a man that is in reputation for a knowing or honest man, That Fornication is sin, but the desire of it is lawful; this interior act of Concupiscence is exempt from sin, because the opinion was probable. *Sanch. op. mor. lib.* 1. *c.* 16. *p.* 71.

10. There may be a dispensation granted for Fornication, because it's not evident that it's forbidden by the Law of Nature; and it's probable that it is only by the positive Law. *Tamb. lib.* 7. *decal. c.* 1. *f.* 2. *n.* 1. And so it may be made lawful when Authority shall think it convenient to take away the prohibition, which alone renders it evil and criminal.

11. A man may be invincibly ignorant that Fornication is a sin; and in that case if he doth commit Fornication, it's no sin, because invincible ignorance excuseth

cuſeth from ſin, therefore a man in ſtate of ignorance may commit Fornication without ſin. *Fillut. mor. Tom.2. tr.30. c.2. n.50. p.389. Azor. Tom.1. lib.1. c.13. p.34.*

12. Maſters and Maid-Servants, and Coſins of both Sexes living together, and mutually induced by that means unto ſin, if their relapſes be but once or twice a moneth, they may continue therein, when they cannot avoid them without finding the World matter of diſcourſe, or running into ſome inconvenience thereby. *Myſt. of Jeſuit. p.146.*

13. If the Concubine be very uſeful to the Fornicator to cheriſh him, and to keep him in good humour, ſo that without her he lives in Melancholy, and hath great diſtaſt of the food which is prepared for him; he cannot be obliged in this caſe to put away his Concubine, becauſe his ſatisfaction in theſe circumſtances are more worth than any temporal good. *Sanctius in ſelect. diſp. 10. n.20.*

14. If you be deſired by your Friend to carry a Preſent to be given on the account of diſhoneſt love, unto a Concubine, to whom he ſends it, you may carry it without ſin, if you have a juſt cauſe of fearing a conſiderable loſs. *Tamb. lib. decal. c.1. ſ.4. n.30.* as the loſs of your Friend.

15. Abſolution may be given a Woman who entertains at her houſe a man with whom ſhe offends frequently, if ſhe cannot handſomely ſend him away. *Bauny's Theol mor. p.1. tr.4. de pœnit. q.14. p.94.*

16. It's lawful for a married woman to retain to her ſelf the price of her Adultery; and the reaſon is excellent, becauſe the Husband is not ſo Maſter of the body of his Wife, that he hath a perfect dominion over it; but he hath only the power to uſe it according to the Law of Marriage, which certainly takes not from the Woman power to gain ſomething by proſtituting her Body. *Tamb. lib. 1. decal. c.2. ſ.6. n.12.*

17. If a Concubine dyes or withdraws her ſelf, it's lawful for the Man to take another Maid-Servant, what fear ſoever he hath of falling into ſin with her, if he cannot find ſome other who is capable to aſſiſt him in his affairs and conveniences; for if this reaſon diſpenſe with him for not putting her away whom he hath already taken, it will give him a right to take her whom he hath not as yet. *Sanct. ſelect. diſp. 10. n.20.*

18. By the Bull *Cruciata*, a man may be diſpenſed with the vow he hath made not to commit Fornication or any other ſin. *Addit. to the Myſterie of Jeſuitiſm. p.95. §.25.*

CHAP. VIII.

Of Murder.

1. IT's lawful for an honourable perſon to kill an aſſailant who would ſtrike him with a Cudgel, or give him a box on the ear to affront him, if he cannot otherwiſe avoid the diſgrace. *Leſſius de Juſtitia & Jure, lib. 2. c.9. dub. 8. n.41. p.83.* otherwiſe the reputation of the innocent perſon would be perpetually expoſed to the affronts of the inſolent. *Azor. Inſt. mor. par.3. p.105. Hurtado de Mendoza 22. diſp.170. ſ.16. §.137.*

2. If a man endeavour to deprive me of my honour before a Prince, Judge or perſon of great quality, by accuſing me of ſome feigned crimes, and I have no other way to divert this loſs of reputation, it's lawful for me to kill him ſecretly. *Leſſ. lib.2. c.9. dub.12. n.77. p.81.* And the ſame may be done againſt him, though the crime be true, ſo it be hid and ſecret. *Bannes. q.64. a.7. dub.4.* And *Molina* gives the reaſon, becauſe it's lawful to imploy all ſorts of means, and to make uſe of all ſorts of ways, and of all ſorts of Arms, to do that which is neceſſary for ſelf-defence. *Molina. de Juſt. & Jure. Tom.4. tr.3. diſp.2. n.5. p.175.*

3. To defend our ſelves from an affront which would be given us, it's lawful

to prevent the aggreſſor by killing him, in the ſame manner as when a man endeavours to deprive us unjuſtly of life or member, it's lawful to kill him before he execute his deſign. *Amicus, Tom.5. de Juſti. & Jure, diſp.36. ſ.7. n.106.p.542, 410,407.*

4. If any perſon doth unjuſtly detain your goods from you, you may kill him when you cannot without great trouble and difficulty recover them by the way of Juſtice. *Leſs. de juſt. & jure, lib.2. c.9. dub. 11. n.70. Dicaſt. lib.2. tr. 1. diſp. 10. dub. 5. n.46.* This is an excellent invention to cut off all Suits, there is no need of Judges or Counſellors, but any may do themſelves Juſtice; and inſtead of ſending a Serjeant to arreſt the party who detains the goods, he may ſend one to take away his life.

5. If any perſon ſhall take from you an Apple, or any thing to the value of five ſhillings, and will not reſtore it, if it will be a ſhame to you not to take it out of the Thief's hand, you may endeavour to take it from him, and even kill him if it be neceſſary. *Leſs. de Juſt. & Jure, lib.2. c.4. c.9. d.11. n.68. p.88.*

6. If a man hath committed a crime which is not publickly known, and he underſtands that another hath a deſign to inform againſt him, before a Magiſtrate, if he fears leſt his Accuſer ſhould cauſe him to be condemned to loſe his life, or goods, he may lawfully kill him. *Molina de Juſt. & Jure, Tom.4. tr. 3. n. 39. p.121. Dicaſt. lib.2. tr.2. diſp.12. par. dub. 2. n.410.*

7. It's no Murder to kill excommunicated perſons. *Grat. cauſ.23. q.5. c.omnium & exam. fo.460. Edit. Paris. 1531.*

8. It's lawful to kill all thoſe who do us wrong, and all other perſons who offend us, though we be aſſured that they ſhall be damned by dying in that ſtate. *Eſcob. tr. 1. exam.7. c.2. p.1154. ſ.1. n.21.* And this right doth not only appertain to one private man, againſt another private man, but to a publick perſon; to a Subject againſt his Prince or Superior; to a Son againſt his Father, or the Father againſt the Son. *Amicus de Juſt. et Jure, diſp.36. ſ.5. n.76. p.407.*

9. If any perſon ſhall endeavour to take away from you your Eſtate unjuſtly by foul practices and vexatious Suits at Law; it's lawful to accept or give a Challenge; nay, a man may diſpatch his enemy at unawares; nay in ſuch occurrences a man need not confine himſelf to the ordinary ways of Duels, if he can ſecretly murder his adverſary, and thereby put an end to the buſineſs; for by that means he ſhall not only avoid the hazard he may be in, by expoſing his life in fighting, but alſo not participate of the ſin which his enemy would commit by the Duel. *Sanch. Theol. mor. lib.2. c.39. n.7. Provinc. Letter, 7. fo.90.* So if perſons ſhall conſpire to ruin you, or ſhall unjuſtly hinder your Creditors from paying you what they owe unto you, it's lawful for you to kill them. *Leſs. de Juſt. & Jure, lib.2. c.11. n.67. p.88.*

10. A man may lawfully kill (by ambuſh and behind his back) an Informer that proſecutes us in any Court, provided there be a right direction of the Intention; he may lawfully kill the falſe witneſs which ſuch a proſecutor produceth againſt him; and the Judge alſo, if there be any correſpondency between him and the witneſs. *Molina, Tom.4. tr.3. diſp.12. Reginaldus, lib.21. c.5. n.57. Tannerus, tr.3. diſp 4. q.8. n.83. Provinc. Letter, 7. fo. 90.*

11. A Prieſt is obliged to kill a Detractor. *Myſt. of Jeſuit. p.94.97.*

12. If a man hath made uſe of a woman, he may kill her if ſhe offer to diſcover what paſſed between them. *Myſt. of Jeſuitiſm, p. 18. §. 6. Caramuel. fund. 55. ſ.7. p.551.*

13. When he who is aſſaulted be a perſon whoſe life is of importance, and neceſſary to the weal publique and others, whether it be in Temporals or Spirituals, he is obliged under mortal ſin to kill if he can the aggreſſor in defence of his life. *Molina de Juſt. Commutat. tr. 3. d.14. p.1754;* becauſe he cannot give away the right of thoſe who belong unto him, to whom his life is neceſſary, being

ing obliged to maintain and defend them; therefore he ſins mortally in not killing the aggreſſor if he can, for the preſervation of his life.

14. He commits not the ſin of Manſlaughter, who kills him who invades him unjuſtly, though he gave him an occaſion to aſſault him. *Amicus de Juſt. & Jure, diſp.36. dub.5. n.25. p.538.* And when it's lawful to kill an invader, it's lawful to deſire his death, as a means neceſſary for our defence. *Dicaſt. lib.2. tr.1. diſp. 10. dub.4. n.4.*

15. It's lawful to kill him who ſays to you, *You lie. Bandellus, lib.3. diſp.24. n.24. Provincial Letter.7. fo.93.*

16. An Adulterer may lawfully kill the Husband of a Woman with whom he hath committed adultery, if her Husband, having ſurpriſed him in the fact, doth aſſault him. *Molina de Juſt. & Jure, Tom.4. diſp.14 p.1765. Tamb. lib.16. decal. c.1. ſect.1. n.7.* This is an excellent way for an Adulterer to expiate his crime, by making away the Husband's life, after he hath taken away the Wifes honour.

17. A Thief being entred into a Houſe to ſteal, may in conſequence kill him who would kill him for his Theft, if he cannot eſcape death. *Molina de Juſtitia & Jure, Tom.4. p.1766. n.2.*

18. If a Thief fly away on Horſeback, he may be purſued with a Weapon, or killed with a Piſtol-ſhot, when after he hath been threatned to be killed, he ceaſe not to bear away what he hath taken; and though he be not threatned nor admoniſhed thereof, becauſe time permit not, and there is danger never to recover what he carries away. *Dicaſt. lib.2. tr.1. diſp.10. dub.5. n.46.*

19. It's not againſt charity to kill a Thief who robs me of things which I cannot recover at Law without much trouble. *Dicaſt. ibidem.*

20. If an honourable perſon be aſſaulted, and in danger to loſe his reputation, if he fly, though by flying he might preſerve his own life, and his who aſſaults him, he is not for all that obliged to fly; but it's lawful to kill him, who invades him unjuſtly in defence of his life and honour. *Mol. Tom.4. p.1778.* For when a man hath only his honour to defend, he is not obliged to fly, becauſe he is to ſet more by his honour, than money or goods; therefore there is no reaſon to oblige Chriſtians to loſe poſſeſſion of ſo pretious a thing as Honour; by flying from him who aſſaults them ſo unjuſtly.

21. It's lawful to kill a ſlanderer or falſe witneſs ſecretly in an affair, wherein not only life, but even outward goods alſo of great importance are in queſtion. *Amic. Tom.5. de Juſt. & Jure, diſp. 36. ſect.4. n.76. p.537.*

22. If any one aſſault you, and makes uſe of an innocent perſon to ſhelter him, you may kill him, that you may hit him who invades you. *Eſcob. tr.1. exam.7. n. 52. p.121.* If a man fly from his enemy and cannot eſcape but through ſome ſtrait way, wherein he will cruſh to death ſome Infant or lame perſon, he may kill or ride over him, though he be aſſured that he will die thereof; becauſe every man hath right to defend himſelf, and his meeting with or interpoſure of an innocent perſon doth not take away his right. *Leſs. de Juſt. lib.2. c.9. dub.9. n.57. p.86.*

You may obſerve how highly this new Theologie of the Jeſuits hath obliged the World, in granting this liberty to defend mens lives, honours and goods againſt any aggreſſor, which the Goſpel of Jeſus Chriſt hath denyed unto them. By this Indulgence people are kept in obedience from invading the rights of others, and peace eſtabliſhed amongſt them, for fear of offending, when the perſon offended, is both Judge, Party, and Executioner; by their divinity you may kill an Enemy, a Slanderer, a Thief, an Informer in falſe crimes, and even in true ones, but ſecret; and which is yet more, an innocent perſon, and from whom you never received any diſpleaſure; an Infant, a Prince, a King, without excepting Fathers or Mothers; you may Challenge into the fields, aſſaſſinate publickly,

kill

kill by ſurpriſe, cauſe to die ſecret, by poyſon or otherwiſe, for preſervation of the life, honour or goods, and even for the leaſt thing, as for an Apple; and all theſe without ſin or puniſhment; what mortals can deſire more, we know not.

CHAP. IX.

Of Theft.

1. THeft is no mortal ſin, if he that ſteals doth believe that his Father, Maſter or he from whom he ſteals the goods, would have given him them, if he had asked him, or if he had known he had need of them, or when he makes no account of the goods which are ſtollen from them, or when he is of ſuch a diſpoſition, that he would not have him that had ſtollen them from him, obliged therefore to any great puniſhment. *Leſs. de Juſt. & Jure, lib.* 2. *c.* 41. *d.* 9. *n.* 79. *p.* 496.

2. Theft, which Men and Maid-Servants commit in Meats and Drinks, are no great ſins, though inſenſibly they amount unto a notable value; if they ſteal them only to eat and drink them, themſelves. *Leſs. de Juſt. & Jure, lib.* 2. *c.* 12. *d.* 8. *n.* 48. *p.* 118. *Eſcob. tr.* 1. *Exam.* 9. *n.* 25. *p.* 162.

3. A Woman may take and purloin money from her Husband upon divers occaſions; and amongſt others, ſhe may take it to game withal, to buy her cloaths, and to get other things ſhe ſtands * in need of. *Eſcob. tr.* 1. *exam.* 9. *n.* 13.

* *A Gallant.*

4. The poor in extraordinary neceſſity may ſteal from the rich with a ſafe Conſcience. *Vaſquez de Eleemoſyna. c.* 4. *n.* 45. *Provinc. Letter.* 11. *fo.* 177. *Tambur. lib.* 5. *decal. c.* 1. *ſect.* 1. *n.* 12.

5. He who taketh what is anothers, doth him no wrong if he made no uſe of it, or was not like to uſe it; neither is he obliged to reſtitution. *Em. Sa. verbo, Furtum. c.* 6. *p.* 292.

6. He who ſteals frequently by little at a time, ſo to gather together a notable ſum, is not obliged to reſtitution when it's not done with intention to ſteal this great ſum. *Exam. Sa. verb. Furtum, n.* 8. *Eſcob. tr.* 1. *Exam.* 4. *n.* 23. *p.* 161.

7. Where a man hath by many petty Thefts proceeded unto a great ſum, he is not obliged under pain of damnation to reſtore any of it, becauſe he only ſinned venially. *Bauny in his Sum. c.* 10. *p.* 143. By this a man may enrich himſelf with the goods of another, provided he takes not too much at once.

8. If a man finds any thing which doth belong to another, he may appropriate it to himſelf; and though the true owner appears afterwards, he is not obliged to quit the poſſeſſion of it; and if he ſhall alienate or ſpend it without fraud or unjuſt contrivance ſimply and honeſtly, the Owner comes and preſents himſelf, he is not obliged to reſtore any thing unto him, but what he hath put out to uſe, and whereby he is become more wealthy. *Bauny in his Sum. c.* 13. *p.* 185, 186. *Layman. lib.* 3. *tr.* 1. *c.* 5. *n.* 24.

9. A perſon after he hath made a renuntiation of his Goods unto his Creditors, may in Conſcience ſubſtract and keep one part of his Goods to maintain his Family and his Port. *Bauny's Sum. c.* 11. *p.* 154.

10. It's lawful for Servants to rob their Maſters to make their Wages proportionable to their Service. *Myſt. of Jeſuit. p.* 126. *Letter.* 6. *fo.* 8.

11. A religious man may quit his habit, and go and ſteal, as well as go *incognito* to the Stewes. *Myſt. of Jeſuit. p.* 69.

12. A Son may with a ſafe conſcience ſteal money from his Father. *Addit. to the Myſt. of Jeſuit. p.* 93. §. 12.

CHAP. X.

Of Deceit.

1. A Vintner who hath better Wine than ordinary, for that he may not ſell it by reaſon of ſome publique order, above the common price, he may recompence himſelf therein by mingling water therewith, becauſe thoſe who buy this Wine have no prejudice thereby. *Eſcob. tr.3. exam. 6. n.* 70. *p.*423. The ſame may be done with grain, he may mingle ſo much of Rie with his Wheat to reduce it to the quality of common grain which is ſold at the ſame price with his. *Amicus de Juſt. & Jure, diſp.*21. *ſect.6. n.*87. *p.*282.

2. A Treaſurer, a Factor, Solicitor, a Servant, and ſuch like, may Traffick with their Maſter's Money without his privity, and retain the profit for themſelves. *Eſcob. tr.*3. *exam.*4. *n.*95. *p.*392.

3. A Taylor who hath been accuſtomed to buy Cloath or Silk by command from another to make his cloathes, goes on this occaſion moſt commonly to a Shop of a Merchant, who for this reaſon ſells him a good pennyworth; the Taylor may retain to himſelf the benefit of his good Market; becauſe the Merchant finds his advantage therein, therefore the Taylor ought to have his advantage thereof. Secondly, becauſe this practice is paſt into a cuſtom. *Fillut. Tom.*2. *tr.*35. *c.*6. *n.*149. *Eſcob. tr.*3. *exam.6. n.*60. *p.*421.

4. If the Magiſtrate hath regulated the Price and Weights of Fleſh, and the Meaſures of Wine, ſo that the price is not ſufficient for the charge, and for their pains, and the wayes of thoſe who ſell theſe Merchandizes, they may diminiſh the weight and the meaſure ſo far, as is neceſſary, to ſatisfie all theſe things. *Amicus, de Juſt. & Jure, d.* 21. *ſect.* 6. *n.* 87. *p.* 282. And being examined by a Judge, whether he hath ſold it too dear, or hath changed the Weight or Meaſures, he may ſay he hath not, and aſſure him, That he hath ſold according to the price appointed, and that he hath obſerved the weight and meaſure intending, according to the money that he hath received. *Sanch. op. mor. lib.* 3. *c.*6. *n.*29. *p.*28.

5. If one thinks and probably believes that the price which is ſet upon any Merchandize, is unjuſt, and that for this reaſon, he who ſells recompences himſelf for this injuſtice by ſelling by falſe Weights, or by ſome other way, being afterwards examined by a Judge upon theſe facts, he may deny all upon oath. *Eſcob. tr.*1. *exam* 3. *n.*34. *p.*75.

6. If a man hath run into debt to ſupply his debaucheries, he may fruſtrate all his Creditors, and continue to live in luxury, by renouncing his eſtate; for he that renounceth his eſtate with ſafety to his Conſcience, may retain ſo much thereof, as is neceſſary for him and his Family to live in honour. *Eſcob. tr.*3. *exam.*2. *n.*163.

7. If a man gets mony unjuſtly, and mingles it with his other the like money which did belong unto him, inſomuch that one cannot diſtinguiſh them; by this means he gains to himſelf the property of the money, and is become the juſt owner and lawful poſſeſſor of it: Therefore if a Merchant or Tradeſman hath received more mony of his Cuſtomers than is due to him, if he mingles this with his other mony that they cannot be diſtinguiſhed from each other, the party who hath paid this mony comes to the Merchant and demands it, he is not obliged to repay it; becauſe that he received it in payment and ſo took it on good account, and in honeſt ſimplicity. *Eſc. tr.*3. *exam.*2. *n.*107. *p.*362. *Vaſquez de Reſtitutione, c.*9. *ſect.* 2. *dubium ultimum.*

8. When Children are grown up and are imployed by their Fathers in their Shops, Trades, or other their Affairs, if their Fathers do not content them and give them a juſt recompence for their pains, it's lawful for them in conſcience to

take ſo much of their Father's Goods ſecretly for their recompence according to the proportion of their labour and pains. *Eſcob. tr.* 1. *exam.* 10. *n.* 31. *p.* 163. So that Children are permitted to eſtimate and rate their own labour and pains, and pay themſelves with their own hands; and this eſtimation depends on their own Judgments and Wills.

9. Cheating is lawful by virtue of the contract *Moliatra*: as when a man buys a Commodity for 30 l. to be paid within a year, and then ſells it immediately to him of whom he bought it, for half ſo much mony. *Myſt. of Jeſuit. p.* 10.

He who prudently maketh uſe of theſe Maxims of the divinity of the *Jeſuits*, may do all his affairs by deceipt, and yet not paſs for all that for a Cheat; and it's but reaſonable, that if a Butcher, Vintner, or other perſon be ill husbands, or an ill chapman, or ſuffer himſelf to be cheated or buy too dear, that the Publique pay for all this: for if the Merchant be an ill buyer, he may be a wicked ſeller; and cheat in ſelling, becauſe he was cheated in buying.

CHAP. XI.

Of Oaths, Promiſes, mental Reſervations, and of Equivocations.

IN conduct of affairs to be well inſtructed in the ſubtilities and inventions of the *Jeſuits* are of great uſe; which may be referred to equivocations in words; and want of intention in Oaths and Promiſes: The one is a means to ſay what you will without lying; and the other an expedient to ſwear and promiſe all things without being obliged to perform any thing.

1. A man may make a promiſe without any intention to promiſe; but in caſe he had an intention to promiſe, but no intention to perform, then he is obliged to his promiſe, but not obliged to perform what he promiſed; the ſame of an oath. *Sanch. op. mor. lib.* 3. *c.* 10. *n.* 7, 8. *p.* 42. *Gr. Valentia.* 22. *d.* 6. *q.* 6. *p.* 1.

2. A man may make a promiſe without any intention to promiſe, and ſo he is not obliged to perform; becauſe he had no intention to promiſe: and therefore if he be asked if he made any ſuch promiſe, he may with a ſafe conſcience ſay, No; intending that he had not promiſed by any promiſe to oblige him; and by conſequence he may alſo ſwear; for otherwiſe he ſhould be conſtrained to pay that which he owes not. *Fillut. Tom.* 2. *tr.* 25. *n.* 323. *p.* 161. And therefore he may ſafely ſay, That he owes not that which he hath promiſed, and that he lies not, in forſwearing it; becauſe, in promiſing and in ſwearing, he had no intention to promiſe or ſwear, no more than to perform what he promiſed.

3. If you have made a promiſe or an oath, and you doubt whether you had an intent to oblige your ſelf; it's probable you are not obliged to keep it. *Tamb. decal.* 1. *c.* 3. *ſect.* 7. *tit. V. n.* 6.

4. To feign in an important matter, and to vow only with ones lips, is but a venial ſin, becauſe it's only a lye which contains no irreverence towards God. *Tamb. decal.* 3. *c.* 12. *ſect.* 1. *n.* 3.

5. If to promiſe without an intention to promiſe, and to promiſe without an intention to do what is promiſed, be not ſufficient, the better to carry on deſigns, and to cauſe your projections to proſper, and to gain belief, it's lawful to add an oath.

6. He who deſires not to ſwear, (the better to obtain belief) may find out many wayes to ſpeak, and to affirm, which paſſeth commonly for oaths, but indeed are not; as for example, If I ſwear by God, wherefore do you not believe me? If this be not, I have no faith in God, I renounce God. This is as true as the Goſpel; Before God this is ſo; God knows it's ſo; On my faith, by my faith, God be my witneſs; I may ſwear by God, by Jeſus Chriſt; I will ſwear by God; though the ignorant, and thoſe who do not look nearly to them, take theſe ſpeeches for oaths, but they are not, becauſe they aſſert nothing, and they are imperfect diſcourſes,

courſes, and have no determined ſence. *Eſcob. tr.* 1. *Exam.* 3. *n.*17. *p.*72. *Sanch. op. mor. lib.*3. *c.*2. *n.*16,17,19,20. *p.*8.

7. When one is reſolved to ſwear, you may chooſe words of double meaning, and make uſe of a mental reſtriction the better to effect your ends; and this is warrantable according to the moſt Learned Doctors amongſt the Jeſuits: for no man is obliged by virtue of his oath, beyond his intention; for an oath cannot oblige in conſcience beyond the intent of him which ſwears; and by conſequence he that hath no intention to ſwear, cannot be obliged to any thing at all. *Sanch. op. mor. lib* 2. *c.*10. *n.*12,13. *p* 49.

8. The art of mental reſtriction or reſervation, is an art of great uſe, and muſt be well ſtudied, and none can teach the Theorie or Practice of it ſo well as the Jeſuits; they being the great Doctors of the faculty of Equivocation. This doctrine ſhall be illuſtrated by ſome few Examples; If a promiſe by oath to pay a certain ſum of Money, be drawn from a man unjuſtly, or by force, he that ſwears in this manner, may uſe an equivocation in theſe terms; I ſwear to you, I will, give this mony; intending that he would give it to him, to whom he ſware, or to ſome other; becauſe theſe words may receive either of theſe two ſences. *Sanch. op. mor. lib.*2. *c.*10. *n.*37. *p.*29.

If a Woman be excommunicated for departing from her Husband, becauſe ſhe knows of ſome ſecret impediment which makes the Marriage void, being at the point of death, ſhe is obliged, that ſhe may receive abſolution to ſwear, That if ſhe recover her health, ſhe will return to her Husband; ſhe may promiſe and ſwear it, intending in her mind, If I be obliged thereunto, or if it ſhall pleaſe me at that time. *Sanch. lib.*3. *c.*6. *n.*40. *p.*30.

9. If in the tongue in which one expreſs an oath, the name of God ſignifie divers things, it will be lawful to ſwear by the Name of God, taking it in ſome other ſignification: According to this rule a man may ſafely ſwear by the Name of Jeſus Chriſt, becauſe there are others named *Jeſus*, beſides the Son of God, and that this word, *Chriſt*, is attributed to divers Perſons in Scripture, and that not only Chriſtians, but to Jews.

10. When one is required to make oath unto a perſon in a caſe in which he believes that he is not obliged to ſwear; he may do it without fear of Perjury; he may make uſe of the one or the other of theſe two expedients; Firſt to take the words wholy he uſes in ſwearing, and which are falſe in their true ſence, in a quite different ſence, ſuch as he pleaſes, provided it be true: Secondly, to give no ſence at all to his words, and to take them materially, that is to ſay, as ſounds which ſignifie nothing. *Sanch. op. mor. lib.* 3. *c.*6. *n.*10. *p.*24.

11. If a perſon be ignorant, and cannot make right uſe of mental reſervation, upon occaſion, he may ſwear plainly without obliging himſelf in any ſort whatſoever, provided he hath no intent to ſwear, nor to perform that which he ſwears. *Eſcobar. tr.* 1. *exam.*1. *n.*37. *p.*76.

12. To eſtabliſh this knowledg of equivocation in the World, and to facilitate the practice of it amongſt all ſorts of people, the Jeſuits have delivered to their diſciples divers excellent rules, and examples for the perfecting of them in this marvellous art of equivocation; therefore, if you be asked, If you have eaten of ſuch a diſh; you may anſwer, I have not eaten of ſuch a diſh; intending in your mind, to day; though the intention of him that asked, was to know if you had ever eaten of it. *Fillut. op. mor. Tom.*2. *tr.*25. *c.*11. *n.*327. *p.*204.

If one enquire whether the Prince be at Court, he may ſay and ſwear it too, without any great ſin, that he is there, (though he be not there) intending that he is there in picture. *Eſcob. tr.*1. *exam.*1. *n.*35. *p.*76.

If one demands of a man to borrow mony, which he indeed hath, but which he will not, and which he is not obliged to lend; he may ſwear that he hath it not at all; meaning not to lend him, or meaning not in another place than in

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that where he laid it up to be kept. *Fillut. op. mor. Tom.2. tr.25. c.11. n.15.*

If a Witneſs be interrogated juridically if he know a thing; provided the Judge ask him not whether he hath heard it ſpoken; he may ſwear he knows it not, having only heard it ſpoken. *Fillut. op. mor. Tom.2. tr.25. c.7. n.5. p.32.*

If he be interrogated by a Judge, Whether he had done ſuch a thing? he may ſafely ſwear he hath not done it, when he hath done it; intending in his mind ſome other thing, which he hath not in truth done, or ſome other day than that on which he did it, or ſome other circumſtance as he pleaſes, ſo it be true; he doth not lye, neither is he forſworn. *Sanch. op.mor.lib.3. c.6. n.15.* This is a rare way to juſtifie all manner of lies, and perjuries: The greateſt Impoſtors may make uſe hereof to maintain themſelves in theſe crimes.

And it's always juſtifiable when neceſſary, or advantagious in any thing that concerns a man's Health, Honour or Eſtate. *Zanch. op. mor. p.2. lib. 3. c. 6. n 12. Provinc. Letter.9. §.129,130. Fillutius* aſſigns a way much more ſecure than the former, to avoid lying; and that is when a man having ſaid, *I ſwear I have not done ſuch a thing*, he adds, whiſpering to himſelf, *this day. Fillut. tr.25. c.11. n.331.* This is to ſpeak truth towards himſelf, and lie to others. Men will be often at a loſs if they have not this Science.

13. It's not enough to know the Rules of any Myſtery, if it be not known how to reduce them to practice.

Therefore there are two Rules given by the Jeſuits, that men may have change, and make uſe ſometimes of one, and ſometimes of the other.

The firſt is, to have an intention to pronounce the words materially, that is to ſay, as if they ſignified nothing; and to take from them in his mind their proper ſignification not deſiring they ſhould have any at all. And that this method may be made eaſie to underſtand, take this example: If a man be interrogated by a Judge if he did ſuch a fact; he may ſafely ſwear he did it not; with this mental reſtriction *(this day)*, though he did it at another day. *Fillut. op. mor. Tom.2. tr.25. c.12. n.328. p.204.*

The ſecond rule or method is, To have an Intention to compoſe ones diſcourſe, not only of words, which are audibly pronounced, but alſo of thoſe which are ſecretly reſerved in ones mind, it being free for thoſe who ſpeak, to expreſs their thoughts wholly or in part. *Fillut. ibidem.*

14. It's lawful in our defence at all times to make uſe of equivocation, though he who doth examine us, do preſs us and make us ſwear not to uſe them, but to anſwer him without making uſe of equivocation: he may ſafely ſwear, underſtanding ſecretly that he doth it as far as he is obliged to ſpeak clearly, and to expound himſelf, or by forming ſome other thought, which may make him anſwer true. *Sanch. op. mor. lib.3. c.6. n.45. p.30.*

If any one be examined by a Judge if he did ſuch a thing, he may ſwear he hath not done it; intending his anſwer, Not in that manner as the Judge examins him maliciouſly, but in the manner he ought to examin him in the quality of a Judge. *Sanch. ibidem.*

15. When a Prince commands a Subject to do ſuch a thing when he receives his orders, he promiſes to obey him; though he be reſolved to do nothing of that he ſhall command him, by making uſe of this mental reſtriction, ſaying in himſelf, I will do this not as you command me, but as you ought to command me. *Sanch. ibidem.*

16. A Wife or Children being called before a Judge to declare and confeſs what they have put aſide or taken out from, or uſurped of the moveables or Goods of the deceaſed, are not in conſcience obliged to confeſs, or declare the ſame; but becauſe they may be brought to ſwear, they may make uſe of this expedient that they may not lie, and ſo doing forſwear themſelves, the prudent Confeſſor may teach them that they are to frame a conception in their mind,

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according to which they may form their anſwer and oath, which they may make by the command of the Judge, to juſtifie and make him believe their innocence. *Bauny his Sum. c.* 11. *p.*156.

17. One is diſcharged of his oath, though in doing what he ſwears to do, he hath an expreſs intent not to do or fulfil it. *Leſs. lib.* 1. *c.* 37. *d.* 10. *n.*59.

18. If I ſwear to do ſuch an act, and have no intention to ſwear, though I do not perform the act, I am not forſworn, becauſe an oath depends on the intention of him who ſwears. *Em. Sa. verb. Jurament. n.*1. *p.*295.

19. If a man lies in uſing equivocation without any neceſſity obliging him thereunto, and ſwears to confirm this Equivocation, he doth neither lie nor commit perjury; becauſe he that ſpeaks and ſwears in that ſort, hath no intention to ſpeak or ſwear falſly. *Fillut. To.*2. *tr.*25. *c.*11. *n* 331. *p.*205. This Maxim is of admirable uſe to licence the Lies and Oaths which ſome do make uſe of ordinarily to deceive others, and thoſe who forſwear themſelves before Judges.

20. Oaths, which are made without actual advertency and conſideration, which of themſelves are ſufficient to a mortal ſin, are not of themſelves new ſins properly, becauſe of the cuſtom of ſwearing, how great ſoever they be, though no retraction be made of them. *Sanch. mor. par.* 1. *lib.*3. *c.*5 8,28. *p.*21.

21. If one commit Perjury through natural inadvertency, or becauſe of an ill cuſtom he hath to forſwear, it's no mortal ſin; becauſe he doth forſwear himſelf without perceiving it at all. *Fillut. mor. To* 2. *tr.*25 *c.* 1. *p.* 173.

22. When a man blaſphemes cuſtomarily without having full knowledg thereof, he doth not ſin mortally. *Fill. ibidem.*

23. It's a leſs ſin to ſwear in common talk by the holy Name of God, than it's to eat an Egg in Lent. *Sanch. Fillut.*

24. It's lawful as well in Judgment as out of Judgment, to ſwear with a mental reſervation without any regard to the intent of him who obliges a man to ſwear. *Myſt. of Jeſuit. p.* 10.

25. To call God to witneſs to a light inconſiderable Lie, is not ſo great an irreverence, as that a man ſhould or muſt be damned for it. *Myſt. of Jeſuitiſm, p.* 10. *ſ.* 5.

CHAP. XII.

Of the Doctrine of Probability.

1. THat Opinion is probable which hath one only Author of Reputation, or one reaſon to maintain it; and that which is ſupported by a probable opinion, is ſimply good and lawful; and a man may ſafely in Conſcience act by it. *Em. Sa. verbo Dubium. n.*3. *p.*183. Nay, though many Doctors do poſitively hold the contrary, yet if any one Doctor who hath examined and weighed the Reaſons of thoſe who hold the contrary, doth ſay, That the action is good and lawful; the opinion is probable, and you may in Conſcience act by it. Therefore if a Prieſt, of whom I have a good opinion for his integrity and parts, ſhall tell you; It's lawful for you to burn a City or any other place, though it be againſt the Principles of Juſtice or Charity; yet to you it's probable, and ſo you may ſafely fire the City without ſin: And the moſt univerſally condemned Crimes may become lawful to you for to act, if a Prieſt in whom you have a Confidence for his Learning and Honeſty, ſhall tell you they are lawful. *Eſcob. in præfat. Theolog. problemat.* And in caſe you have a great deſire to do any thing, and can find no opinion to rely on, and to aſſure you it's probable; it's enough that you are probably aſſured, that the opinion is probable; ſo that probability is not only ſufficient to excuſe ſin, but probability of a probability. *Tamb. lib.*1. *decal. c.*3. *ſect.*3. *n.*126.

2. When two opinions are probable, the one as well as the other, we may

juſtly prefer in the practice that which is leſs probable, though not ſo ſafe, if you like it beſt, or may be more acceptable to others. *Azor. lib.2. c. 16. p. 126. Dicaſt. de Confeſſione, tr.4. d.9. d.8. n.134.* A Councellor at Law may counſel his Client that adviſeth with him, not according to his own opinion, but the contrary which other Councellors hold probable, if it be more favourable and acceptable to the Client, though he doth know and believe aſſuredly that the opinion of the other Councellor is falſe in the Theory, and therefore not to be followed in the Practice. *Layman. lib.1. tr.1. c.5.* Nay, a Learned Councellor may give to Plaintiff and Defendent, counſels quite contrary according to contrary probable opinions. *Layman. ibidem. Sanch. op. mor. lib.1. c.9. n.20.*

3. It's lawful in Conſcience for a man to quit his own proper opinion, though more probable to follow the probable opinion of another though leſs ſure; becauſe, he who believes an opinion probable, acting according to that opinion, ought not to be deemed as raſh and imprudent: Upon this Principle *Pilat* acted when he put *Jeſus Chriſt* to death, quitting his proper Judgment, by which he believed him to be innocent, to follow the opinion of the *Jews*, who maintained that he was worthy of death. Nay, *Pilat* herein, according to the Jeſuits, ought to be juſtified, becauſe he followed a probable Opinion, and more than probable, becauſe it was not the opinion of one Doctor, but of all the Doctors and Prieſts of the *Jews*, That *Jeſus* was a Malefactor and deſerved death. *Matth. 25.*

4. When one believes aſſuredly that an Opinion is falſe, and that we cannot follow it directly in the conduct of ſome perſon, we may ſend this perſon to thoſe who hold with it, and counſel him to follow their advice. *Layman. lib. 1. c. 5. p. 7.*

5. If you meet with two contrary Opinions, you may follow them both in different affairs, and even in the ſame affair alſo, acting and giving contrary counſels, now after the one, and then after the other. *Layman. lib. 1. c.5. p.6.*

6. A man may hold an opinion probable, when he is perſuaded that he himſelf or ſome other can anſwer the reaſons upon which that opinion is grounded; and it's ſafe in Conſcience to act according to ſuch a probable opinion. *Sanch. op. mor. lib.1. c.9. n.6. p.28.*

7. When a Superior and thoſe which are under his charge be of different opinions, the Inferior is not bound to obey his Superior: and therefore when a Subject believes according to a probable opinion, that the Commands of his Prince are unjuſt, or that he exceedeth the bounds of his Juriſdiction, he may diſobey him, becauſe it's lawful for all men to follow a probable opinion. *Eſcob. in præm. Exam.3. n.31. p.30.*

8. The priviledges of Probability cannot only diſpenſe with an Inferior for the obedience which he owes to his Superior, but may elevate him above his Superior, and to oblige the Superior to obey his Subject. Upon this Principle a Confeſſor is obliged to follow the probable opinion of his Penitent, and quit his own opinion, though more probable; becauſe the Penitent grounding himſelf upon a probable opinion, hath a right unto abſolution. *Eſcob. in præm. Exam. 3. c.6. n.27. p.25.* And the Confeſſor is obliged to abſolve the Penitent againſt his own proper opinion, when the Penitent following the Maxims of a probable opinion, believes that he may do that, which the Confeſſor believes he may not do, according to his probable opinion. *Amicus. Tom. 3. diſp. 15. ſect. 2. n. 90. p.212.*

9. It's probable that an Exciſe is juſtly eſtabliſhed by a Prince; it's probable on the other ſide, that it's unjuſt; you being at preſent appointed by the Prince to collect this Impoſt, require it according to this Opinion, which maintains that it's juſt, and therefore it's lawful for you to levy it without doing any injuſtice: but if to morrow, or the ſame day, you being a Merchant, may ſecretly defraud this Impoſt or Exciſe, following the Opinion that it's unjuſt. *Tamb. lib.1. Theol. c.3. ſect.5. n.1,2,3. p.21.*

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10. A man may, relying on an Opinion ſweet and indulgent, but probable, diſobey his Prince or Superior in a thing in which it's probable that he is not obliged to obey, but it's more probable that he is obliged to the Prince or Superior following the Opinion which is more ſafe, judges that he ought to obey, and therefore that he hath ſinned; the Prince or Superior hath reaſon to command obedience, the Inferior hath reaſon not to obey, both founded upon probable Opinions; inthis caſe the Prince or Superior is raſh, if he judges that the Inferior ſins becauſe it's not probable, that he ſins who follows a probable Opinion, and ſo it being probable, that the Inferior hath not ſinned; the Prince or Superior ſhall be unjuſt, if he treats him as guilty; for where there is no fault, there is no puniſhment. *Cat. in Com. in Reg. 6. Bernard. lib. 1. n. 65.*

11. He who believes that it's more probable that we cannot in Conſcience follow that of the two Opinions which is moſt probable, may yet follow it himſelf, if he believes that it's alſo probable that he may follow it. *Sanch. op. mor. lib. 1. c. 17. p. 30.*

12. It's probable, that the loſs of Reputation may, and may not be compenſated with Mony; therefore this day, you being defamed, deſire ſatisfaction in Mony, and to morrow or this day you having defamed another, may ſafely deny to allow him the ſame compenſation. *Tamb. lib. 1. Theol. c. 3. ſect. 5. n. 1, 2, 3. p. 21.*

13. A lawful Prince doth publiſh Juſt Laws for his Subjects to obey, and they have no cauſe to complain thereof; or juſt reaſon to refuſe them: the Subjects do ſin, and it may be ſaid they do not ſin at all; for there is great Authority and Reaſons on each ſide to make both Opinions probable, and to give liberty to which the Jeſuits pleaſe; but the more ſafe, and more probable is to diſobey. *Eſc. Tom. 1. lib. 5. ſ. 2. c. 14. prob. 13. p. 160.*

But Prieſts and Eccleſiaſtics, muſt be exempted from obedience to the Laws of Princes; for they are not Subjects of neceſſity and obligation, but only out of reſpect and good example towards Princes Laws, which regard the Government of their States, and which derogate not from the Eccleſiaſtic State. *Eſcob. Theol. mor. To. 1. lib. 5. c. 15. prob. 19. p. 162.*

14. All probable Opinions are of themſelves as ſafe the one as the other; but the more pleaſant, though they be leſs probable, are always more profitable and more ſafe, becauſe they are more eaſie, and by conſequence more favourable to Temporal Intereſt. *Cat. in Com. in Regal. Sancti Bernardi. lib. 1. d. 6. n. 58. Idem, Theol. fundam. p. 134.*

15. As it's impoſſible that an Opinion which hath the approbation of many Learned Doctors ſhould not be probable, ſo it's impoſſible to reject it; none of their Propoſitions can ceaſe to be probable, if the contrary doth not become an Article of Faith. *Layman. lib. 1. c. 5. p. 2.*

By theſe Maxims, following a probable Opinion, you are exempted from all ſin: you may act, do, or ſay what you pleaſe, and you are ſafe. The Goſpel of Chriſt made men ſinners, but theſe make them all innocent. If there be two perſons which do the ſame thing, he who knows not this doctrine, ſins; and he who doth, ſins not. If things and actions ſhould be meaſured by the Scripture and the Fathers of the Church, they could not be done without ſin; therefore it was neceſſary that the Jeſuits ſhould by their Prudence moderate things ſo, that thoſe things which perſons could not act by the Law of God without ſin, they may ſafely do and act by theſe Maxims. They have diſcovered many new ways to Heaven, which were heretofore unknown to the Church and Jeſus Chriſt himſelf, who hath not ſpoken any thing of them in his Goſpel; if he doth, it hath been only to condemn them. Following the Principles of theſe good men, you will find it's not only eaſie to be ſaved, but it's almoſt impoſſible to be damned; There can be no affair of Conſcience ſo troubleſom or ſo deſperate,

rate, for which Expedients may not be found; nor any Crimes ſo black, which may not eaſily be excuſed and juſtified; there was never a better contrivance invented in the World, than this of probable Opinion; for there are but two Conditions required to make an Opinion probable; Firſt, that it be founded on Reaſons in ſome ſort conſiderable, which will be very eaſie; for no man hath formed an Opinion, but doth believe that the Reaſons which he brings are good enough to ſupport what he maintains. The ſecond condition, That there be no convincing reaſon for the contrary; which is no leſs eaſie than the former; for a reaſon may be convincing in reſpect of one man, which is not to another: and an obſtinate man will always think his Reaſons beſt; but in caſe you cannot anſwer the reaſons on the contrary, you may perſuade your ſelf ſome other more Learned may do it; and ſo it doth remain probable, and you may ſafely act in Conſcience by and according to it, though that which you act or do be againſt the Divine Law, and condemned by God in Scripture. *Sanch. op. mor. lib.*1. *c.*9. *n.*17. *p.* 30.

CHAP. XIII.

Of Judges and Witneſſes.

1. IF the right of the parties ſeem equal on both ſides, the Judg may take money or a preſent of one party, to give advantage whether he pleaſeth, becauſe he may do favour, and this favour may be valued by money, and becauſe for the moſt part the Judg loſeth the friendſhip of one of the parties. *Eſc. tr.* 3 *ex.* 2. *n.* 111. *p.* 363.

2. If the opinions are ſo doubtful and divided, that its in the power of the Judges to follow which he pleaſeth; if one of the parties make him a preſent to gain him to his ſide, the Judg doth not offend againſt Juſtice in receiving that which is given him to follow one of the two Parties rather than the other. *Eſco. tr.*6. *Exam.*6. *n.*44. *p.* 743.

3. A Judge giving Judgment, may follow a probable opinion, leaving that which is more probable; nay he may judg againſt his own proper opinion, as did *Pilat*, who condemned *Jeſus Chriſt*, after he had declared publickly, that he believed him innocent. *Eſcob. in præm. Exam.* 3. *c.*3. *n.*10. *p.*25.

4. When the right of the Parties is not clear, or when it happens that there are different opinions concerning the ſence of the Law; when the one opinion is as probable as the other, it's in the power of the Judge to chuſe which he pleaſeth, and to follow it in his judgment. *Sanch. lib.*1. *c.*9. *n.*45. And he may, if it gives no ſcandal, judge one while according to one opinion, and another time according to another opinion. *Ibidem.* For if he may chooſe of two probable opinions, that which he pleaſeth, it follows, That he may follow ſometimes the one opinion, and ſometimes the other, as he pleaſeth; but if one of the two opinions be more probable than the other, the Judge may pronounce judgment according to that he likes beſt, and even to follow that which he believes to be leſs probable. *Ibidem.* And the Judge doth not herein behave himſelf imprudently or raſhly, guiding himſelf as he doth by a probable opinion. *Ibidem.*

5. If a perſon who hath born falſe witneſs through ignorance or inadvertency, which occaſions the condemnation of a man, and the loſs of life or member to another; he is not obliged after that he underſtands the truth, to retract his falſe teſtimony, for fear of expoſing himſelf to great evils. *Tolet. lib.* 5. *c.*59. *Dicaſt. lib.*2. *tr.*2. *diſp.*8. *dub.*7. *n.*92. For it's lawful to kill an innocent perſon, after we have ſlandered him, rather than to expoſe our ſelves to danger by retracting; though it's not ſo much the offence or Hang-man, as the falſe witneſs which puts him to death.

6. If a Witneſs corrupted by Mony, hide or retire himſelf before he hath been legally

legally examined or cited into the Court; he is not obliged to reſtore the mony he received in this manner. *Dicaſt. lib.2, tr.2. d.4. dub.8. n.156.*

7. If a man is accuſed of a Crime which cannot be legally proved by the Accuſer; he may not only deny the crime, but ſay, That the Accuſer lies and ſlanders him. *Tamb. lib 9. decal. c.2. ſect.2. n.2.* For it's no lie to ſay unto a man he lies, when he knows that he ſpeaks truth, and to ſlander an accuſer as a ſlanderer, where he accuſes us of a crime which we have committed, of two accuſers the one ſpeaks the truth, the other lies; the one objects a true crime, and the other a falſe, yet in that faith the truth is the liar; and he who objects a true crime, is a ſlanderer; which is admirable divinity, and may be made uſe of in conduct of affairs.

8. If a man cannot defend himſelf againſt a falſe and unjuſt Witneſs but by ſlandering of him, he may without ſin, impoſe on him ſo many falſe Crimes as will be neceſſary for his defence. *Tamb. lib. 9. decal. c.2. ſ.2. n.4,5,6,7.* If he doth it, he ſinneth not againſt Juſtice, and by conſequence he is not obliged to reſtitution. *Ibidem.* So that by this Maxim to defend our ſelves from true but ſecret crimes, and whereof there is no publick proof, we may ſay to the honeſteſt man in the World, who would inform againſt us in a Court of Juſtice, That he is a Sodomite, Heretick, Excommunicate, &c. And we may for proof of this Slander, make uſe of falſe witneſſes, counterfeit falſe Deeds and Writings, and corrupt publick Notaries to ſubſcribe them, without committing of any injuſtice at all, though the Scriptures do forbid it as a Sin. So that you may obſerve the Pious Care of theſe holy Fathers, in framing Maxims ſtable to all times, perſons and things. The Goſpel of Chriſt may be uſeful to ſome ends and deſigns, but being not equally ſerviceable to all, many times it's to be laid aſide; for if you make too much uſe of it, it will give a check unto your actings, and obſtruct your deſigns if you act according to its directions.

9. A falſe Witneſs, is he who chargeth one with a falſe Crime; an unjuſt Witneſs, is he who accuſes one of true Crimes, but ſecret, and which he cannot prove according to the form of Juſtice. That Witneſs is to be held for a ſlanderer, who cannot prove the crime which he accuſes one of; and by conſequence having accuſed unjuſtly, he is obliged unto reſtitution. *Dicaſt. lib.2. tr.2. d.12. p.3. dub.18. n.285.*

CHAP. XIV.

Of Reſtitution & Satisfaction.

1. THey which by Traffick, Merchandize, Uſurious Contracts or Bargains, believing them to be good, have gained great Wealth, being invincibly ignorant, that ſuch manner of dealings were forbidden, and unlawful, are not obliged to make Reſtitution of thoſe Goods ſo gotten, although they have ſo gained them, they not being informed of the injuſtice of ſuch Contracts. *Bauny in his Sum. p.156.*

2. If you intreat a Souldier to beat his Neighbour, or to burn the Farm of a man who hath offended you; if the Soldier doth theſe Outrages, you are not obliged out of your Eſtate to repair the damage which proceeds from thence; for no man is obliged to reſtore, if he hath not violated Juſtice; and he doth not, who ſubmits himſelf to another's pleaſure, and only intreats of him a favour. *Bauny in his Sum. c.11. p.200.*

3. A perſon who is indebted for very great Sums of Money, to the prejudice of his Creditors gives away part of his Goods; he to whom the gift is made, is not obliged to reſtore any part thereof to his Creditors, if he be not con-

ſtrained thereunto by Law. *Bauny in his Sum. cap.* 11. *p.* 200.

4. There is no natural Precept which obliges us in this Life to make Satisfaction for Temporal pains. *Fillut. mor. tr.* 6. *c.* 9. *n.* 213. *p.* 159.

5. God puniſhing ſins in Purgatory, when ſatisfaction is not made in this life, the Sinner may without injuſtice refer ſatisfaction unto the other life. *Fillut. Ibidem.* And though the Sinner defers ſatisfaction until the next life, he loſes not by this, neither Bliſs or the Love of God; and though he retards the injoyment thereof, yet the loſs made by this delay may be repayed. *Ibid.*

6. That which one receives for doing any diſhoneſt action, as to cauſe a man to be killed, for committing of fornication for defaming our Neighbours, for bearing of falſe witneſs, may in conſcience be detained, and is not ſubject to reſtitution, if the action be done. *Fillut. mor. Tom.* 2. *tr.* 32. *c.* 4. *n.* 103. p. 364. But if the action be not done, you ought not to pay him till he hath performed the action; as if a man promiſes to pay unto *Titius* 100 l. to aſſaſſinate *Caius.* till he hath done the fact, he can require nothing; and if he hath executed it, common right requires that you pay him what you promiſed to him. *Layman. lib.* 3. *tr.* 4. *c.* 6. *n.* 8. *p.* 377. For the pains which he hath taken, and the danger which he expoſed himſelf unto for your ſake, deſerves to be well recompenſed with money.

7. A Judge who hath taken money for an unjuſt Judgment, is not obliged to make reſtitution, no more than a Murderer who hath taken money to commit a murder. *Leſſius de Juſt. et Jure, lib.* 2. *c.* 14. *diſp.* 8. *n.* 54. *p.* 145. But if the Judge hath taken money to give a juſt ſentence, he is obliged to reſtore that which he hath received, becauſe he hath done no more than he ought to have done; but in giving an unjuſt Judgment, he runs the hazard and loſs of his place, and ſo is not bound to reſtore that which he hath received.

8. This Divinity of theſe good Fathers is very indulgent, and merciful to Sinners; for by their Doctrine, this Judge doth deſerve a reward; but by the Laws of God, a moſt ſevere puniſhment.

9. If a man hath done wrong unto another, he is obliged to make reſtitution, if he did it not expreſly on deſign, and with knowledg. *Eſcob. tr.* 3. *exam.* 2. *n.* 8. *p.* 348. For only Sins of malice oblige us to reſtitution, and not thoſe of Infirmitie or Ignorance.

10. Where it's impoſſible to make reſtitution without diminiſhing ones retinue and expence, ſo as to be taken notice of; he is not bound to reſtitution. *Eſcob. tr.* 3. *exam.* 2. *c.* 4*n.* 37. *p.* 353.

11. Whatſoever wrong a man hath done or cauſed to be done, to ones Neigbour to hinder his wealth, or to procure his hurt, no reſtitution is to be made if he hath uſed no violence, but only Prayers, Promiſes, Preſents to deceive him or cauſe another to deceive him or wrong him. *Eſcob. tr.* 3. *exam.* 2. *n.* 160. *p.* 370.

12. A man is not obliged to reſtore what he hath ſtollen, by trivial and inconſiderable Theft, whatſoever the total ſum thereof may amount unto. *Add to the Myſt. of Jeſuitiſme. p.* 112. §. 16.

A

Summary Account of the Sacred Doctrines, Holy Principles, and Pious Maxims, contained in this Goſpel, neceſſary for all Chriſtians to underſtand, and which will much advance Devotion and Holineſs of Life.

CHAP. 1. 2. 3.

1. THe Biſhop of *Rome* is God.
2. He who is not obedient to the decrees of the Pope, is a Heretick.
3. The Pope is Lord of all temporalties upon Earth.
4. No man ought to ſay unto the Pope, Why doſt thou thus?
5. The Pope may diſpenſe with or againſt the commands of Chriſt or the Apoſtles.
6. The Pope's Will is a Law.
7. All Nations and Kingdoms are under the Pope's Juriſdiction.
8. God hath delivered over unto the Pope, the power and rule of Heaven and Earth.
9. The whole World is the Pope's Inheritance.
10. The Pope hath an almighty infallabilitie and cannot err.
11. The Pope can do all that God himſelf can do, only Sin excepted.
12. He hath power of making Sin, to be no Sin; and that which is no Sin, to be Sin.
13. He can give Empires and Kingdoms to whom he pleaſeth, and depoſe the Poſſeſſors of them.
14. The Pope may depoſe Kings by his power, if they be either negligent in their Adminiſtration of their Government, or do not extirpate all Hereticks out of their Dominions.
15. If a King turns Heretick, he hath no right to his Kingdom; and no man ought to think it ſtrange if the Pope depoſe him.
16. If Kings will not be obedient to the Church of *Rome*, then may the Pope by the great power from Heaven, very juſtly depoſe them; and the Subjects themſelves if the Pope commands them, muſt take up Arms againſt them.
17. The Pope can quit Subjects from their Obedience and Allegiance which they owe to their King.
18. The power of the Pope is greater than that of the Apoſtles, having power to derogate from the Sayings and Words of the Pope.
19. The Doctrine of the Pope is the infallible rule of Faith, and the holy Scripture, hath taken its force, and doth take it from his Holineſs, and he that doth not believe this is an Heretick.
20. The Pope is he by whom Kings reign, according as it's ſaid, *By me Kings reign.*

CHAP.

CHAP. IV.

21. THere is no Precept which obligeth us directly to pray to God to love, believe or hope in him, but only when it's neceſſary to acquire ſome good, or to remove ſome evil.

22. He who prayes not to God in a temptation againſt Chaſtity, Sins only againſt Chaſtity; for he Sins not omitting prayer, but becauſe of the danger he is in to violate Chaſtity.

23. In our private Prayers which we make to God, it's not neceſſary to uſe any Devotion or Attention; nor are we obliged thereunto: and in thoſe which are made by command, we are not obliged unto any inward intention, provided that we rehearſe them outwardly, and behave our ſelves decently and with reſpect.

24. Whatſoever diſtractions or evil thoughts come into our minds when we are at prayer, if they be not on contempt, but negligence, the ſin is but venial.

25. Chriſt commands us to receive the Sacrament of Baptiſm, a Tyrant forbids us upon pain of our Lives, we muſt obey the Tyrant rather then Chriſt.

26. In receiving the Sacrament of the Lord's Supper, it's not neceſſary to have actual Devotion; for let one be diſtracted with evil thoughts in the receiving the Sacrament, provided he contemns it not, yet he is a worthy receiver, and only ſins venially; and ſo if he commits any ſin, in the Communion it ſelf.

27. He who hath ſinned mortally, and hath remorſe for his ſins, and hath confeſſed them to a Prieſt, may well Communicate, though a little before the Communion he hath ſinned mortally.

28. If a man after he hath communicated many times in a bad ſtate, cometh to be converted, he ſhall receive in an inſtant, all the graces which were due to ſo many Communions.

29. It's not neceſſary that the Prieſt who finds himſelf guilty of mortal ſin, ſhould Confeſs himſelf before he Adminiſters the Sacrament.

30. A Perſon who hath abundance, after he hath ſatisfied all his own neceſſaries and thoſe of his Family, having yet a ſuperfluity, is not obliged in a publick Famine to give unto the poor, nor to any one whomſoever, if he ſee him not in eminent danger to dye with Famine.

31. The precept of giving Alms may be fulfilled by lending only, without giving any thing.

32. Rich men are not obliged to give Alms but out of their ſuperfluity, and not then, but in caſe of great neceſſity; thoſe things which may exalt us to a better condition, as to Places or Preferment, are not to be accounted ſuperfluous: Therefore Alms are rarely to be given; for it ſeldom happens that we have goods ſuperfluous.

33. There is no obligation to love our Neighbour; it's ſufficient not to hate him.

34. There is no abſolute Commandment to love God; but when in Scripture we are commanded to love God, they are but Counſels and Advices, and no Commands; for God hath not commanded ſo much to love him, as not to hate him; and he ought to be content that we love him, as little as we pleaſe, and it ſufficeth that we love him much under that we could if we would; for the leaſt degree of love is enough for him.

35. If we be obliged to love God, we are not obliged to love him above Three or Four Months in our Life; whereof the firſt is when we begin to have the uſe of Reaſon. 2. At the point of Death. 3. Every Fifth year during Life.

For

For the reſt of our time we may love God or the World, as we pleaſe.

36. If a man hath committed any mortal ſin, he is not obliged to contrition or ſorrow for that ſin before the Article of his Death.

37. A man may be a Martyr not only without any act of Charity, but alſo without any act of Faith; and though he ſuffers without love to God, and though he never thinks of him.

CHAP. V.

38. HE that by cuſtom is tranſported to do evil, as to Swear or Blaſpheme, ſins not at all, becauſe a man cannot ſin without reaſon, but by an ill cuſtom the uſe of Reaſon is taken away; ſo that he who ſinneth out of thoſe ill habits, is in a better condition than he that hath them not; and by often ſinning, is put into a ſtate of not ſinning any more.

39. Perjury which one commits through natural inadvertency, or becauſe of the cuſtom he hath to Swear, it's no mortal ſin.

40. Thoſe who in their Youth, have committed many actions of a vitious nature, which they did not believe to be ſuch, are not obliged to confeſs them, when they know their nature; becauſe when they committed them, they had not the full uſe of Reaſon; and at moſt they were but venial ſins, if any ſin at all.

41. The pleaſure which is taken in an action of mortal ſin, which is done in ſleep, drunkenneſs, madneſs, or through ignorance, is no ſin.

42. He who doth ſome unlawful act, knowing well that it's forbidden, but not remembring it to be ſuch, when he doth it, is exempt from mortal ſin; becauſe forgetfulneſs or negligence which is the cauſe we think not of it, the evil we are about to do, is not imputed for ſin, if it be not voluntary, if we do not conſider that we are obliged to examine that we are about to do.

43. God cannot command or forbid a thing that is in it ſelf ſlight, under the penalty of mortal ſin.

44. He who hath knowledg in the Law, and is ignorant of the penalty which it ordains againſt thoſe who violate it, doth not incur the penalty.

45. He who hath a will to commit all venial ſins, if he were able, ſins only venially.

46. No man is obliged to avoid the next occaſion of ſin, if ſome great loſs will thereby befall him.

47. A thing is not the next occaſion of ſin, unleſs it be vitious and a ſin of it ſelf.

48. To tell a lye in Preaching on any Doctrinal Point, is but a venial ſin.

49. All the breaches of the Firſt and Second Table of the Decalogue are no ſins at all, when they are committed by any man out of ignorance, ſurpriſe or paſſion.

CHAP. VI.

Of directing the Intention.

50. TO do evil, there must be an evil Intention; but to do good, it's not necessary to have a good Intention.

51. Eccleſiaſticks ſatisfie the Precept of the Church in ſaying Prayers, when they read them without any inward Intention or Devotion, ſo they obſerve outward Decency.

52. If a man ſpeaks never ſo diſhonourably and irreverently of God, it's no blaſphemy if he had not a formal intent to blaſpheme God and diſhonour him.

53. If a man be at Prayers, and hath a bad intent thereunto joyned; as an intent of looking on a Woman diſhoneſtly, it's no ſin.

54. If a man be to do an act, and makes proteſtation that his Intention is not to do any evil; let the act be never ſo wicked, it's no ſin in him.

55. A Mother may wiſh the death of her Daughter, becauſe ſhe cannot match her according to her deſire for want of a Portion.

56. You may deſire the death of an Enemy, who might do you much hurt; not of hatred to him, but to avoid the damage he might do you.

57. To lye with a Woman, when he repreſenteth to himſelf, that he is Married to her; it's no evil, but good.

58. A man may accept of a Challenge to Fight a Duel, not with an intention to fight the duel, but only of defending himſelf.

CHAP. VII.

Of Adultery or Fornication.

59. TO lye with a Married Woman is not Adultery, if the Husband doth conſent thereunto.

60. A Virgin may diſpoſe of her Virginity, and proſtitute her ſelf without the conſent of Parents, and it's no injury to them.

61. To lye with a Woman conſidered as his Wife, is no ſin.

62. If a drunken or Mad-man lyeth with a woman, it's no ſin; becauſe he hath not the uſe of Reaſon.

63. There may be a diſpenſation granted to commit Fornication, becauſe it's not forbidden by the Law of Nature.

64. Men and Women being together, and by that means induced to ſin, if their relapſes be but once or twice a month, they may continue therein, if they cannot ſeparate without ſome inconvenience.

65. It's lawful for a woman to retain to her ſelf the price of her Adultery.

CHAP.

CHAP. VIII.

Of Murder.

66. IT's lawful for an Honourable Perſon to kill an aſſailant, who would ſtrike him with his Cudgel, or give him a box in the Ear.

67. If a perſon endeavour to deprive me of my Honour or Reputation before a Perſon of great Quality, by accuſing me of ſome Crimes; I may kill him, and the ſame may be done againſt him, though the ſin be true, ſo it be hid and ſecret.

68. To defend one's ſelf from an affront which would be given us, it's lawful to prevent the aggreſſor, by killing him.

69. If a man doth detain from me my Goods, and I cannot in courſe of Juſtice receive them without much trouble; it's lawful for me to kill him, though the Goods be but an Apple, or to the value of five ſhillings.

70. It's no Murder to kill an Excommunicated perſon.

71. It's lawful to kill all thoſe who do us wrong, though we be aſſured that they ſhall be damned dying in that ſtate.

72. If any perſon ſhall endeavour to take away from you your Eſtate unjuſtly by foul practices and vexatious Suits at Law; it's lawful for to kill him.

73. A man may lawfully kill by ambuſh and behind the back an Informer that proſecutes in any Court, and likewiſe the Witneſs which the Proſecutor produceth; and alſo the Judge, if he holds a correſpondency with the Witneſs.

74. If a man hath made uſe of a woman, he may kill her, if ſhe offer to diſcover what paſſed between them.

75. He commits not the ſin of Man-ſlaughter, who kills him who invades him unjuſtly, though he gave him an occaſion to aſſault him.

76. It's lawful to kill him who ſayes to you, *You lie.*

77. An Adulterer may lawfully kill the Husband of a woman with whom he hath committed adultery, if her Husband, having ſurpriſed him in the fact, doth aſſault him.

78. It's not againſt Charity to kill a Thief who robs me of things which I cannot recover at Law without much trouble.

79. It's lawful to kill a Slanderer or falſe witneſs ſecretly in an affair, wherein not only Life, but even outward Goods alſo of great importance are in queſtion.

CHAP.

CHAP. IX.

Of Theft.

80. IT's no mortal ſin in him who ſteals, that doth believe that his Father, Maſter, or he from whom he ſteals the Goods would have given him them, if he had asked him, or if he had known that he had need of them, or when he makes no account of the Goods which are ſtolen from them, or when he is of ſuch a diſpoſition that he would not have him that had ſtolen them from him, obliged therefore to any great puniſhment.

81. Theft which Men and Maid-Servants commit in Meat and Drink, are not great ſins, though inſenſibly they amount unto a great value.

82. A woman may take and purloyn money from her Husband to Game withal, and upon divers other occaſions.

83. The Poor in extraordinary neceſſity may ſteal from the Rich with a ſafe conſcience.

84. He who taketh what is anothers, doth him no wrong, if he made no uſe of it, or was not like to uſe it.

85. He who ſteals frequently by little at a time ſo to gather together a great Sum, is not obliged to reſtitution, when it's not done with intention to ſteal the great Sum.

86. If a man finds any thing which doth belong to another, he may appropriate it to himſelf though he knowes the Owner, and he demands it.

87. It's lawful for Servants to ſteal from their Maſters, to make their Wages proportionable to their Services.

88. A Son may with a ſafe Conſcience ſteal Money from his Father.

89. A Religious Perſon or Prieſt may quit his habit, and go and ſteal; as well as go *incognito* to the Stews.

CHAP. X.

Of Deceit.

90. A Treaſurer, Factor, Solicitor or Servant, and ſuch like, may Traffick with their Maſter's Money, without his privity, and retain the profit for themſelves.

91. If a Tax be impoſed upon Wine, the Vintner having better Wine then ordinary, to recompence himſelf may mingle water with wine; and he that buyeth, hath no loſs thereby.

92. A Taylor who is imployed to make Cloathes for another perſon, buyes a good Bargain of Cloath of a Merchant of whom he uſeth to buy; the Taylor may make his benefit of this good penyworth, and make his Cuſtomer pay what it's truly worth.

93. If the Magiſtrate regulate the Price and Weights of Fleſh, and the Meaſures of Wine, ſo as the Price is not ſufficient for the Charge, Pains, and the wayes of thoſe who ſell theſe Merchandizes; they may diminiſh the Weight and Meaſure ſo far as it's neceſſary to ſatisfie all theſe things; and if they be examined before the Magiſtrate concerning the ſame, they may deny all upon oath.

94. If a man hath run into debt to ſupply his Debaucheries, he may fruſtrate all his Creditors, and continue to live in Luxury by renouncing his Eſtate; for he may with ſafety to his Conſcience retain ſo much thereof, as is neceſſary for him and his Family to live in honour.

95. If

95. If a man gets Money unjuſtly, and mingles it with his own, ſo as they cannot be diſtinguiſhed the one from the other; by this means he gains to himſelf the property of the Money, and may juſtly detain it.

96. Cheating is lawful by the Contract *Moliatra*.

CHAP. XI.

Of Oaths, Promiſes, Mental Reſervations and Equivocations.

97. IF a man makes a promiſe without any intention to promiſe, or makes a promiſe without any intention to perform; in neither caſe he is obliged to perform what is promiſed, though an oath be ſuperadded, becauſe he had no intent to oblige himſelf either by his promiſe or his oath.

98. If you have made a promiſe or an oath, and you doubt whether you had an intent to oblige your ſelf, it's probable you are not obliged to keep it.

99. To feign in an important matter, and to vow only with one's lips without any intention, is but a venial ſin; becauſe it's only to lye, which is no great irreverence towards God.

100. He who deſires not to ſwear (the better to obtain belief) may find out many wayes to ſpeak and to affirm, which commonly paſſeth for oaths, but indeed are not.

101. When one is reſolved to ſwear, you may chooſe words of double meaning, and make uſe of a mental reſtriction, the better to effect your ends; no man is obliged by his oath beyond his intention, ſo by conſequence if you have no intention to ſwear, you are not obliged.

102. The art of mental reſtriction or reſervation is of great uſe, and muſt be well ſtudied; if a promiſe by oath be drawn from a man unjuſtly by force to pay a certain Sum of Money; he that ſwears in this manner may uſe an equivocation in theſe terms, *I ſwear to you, I will give this Money*, intending to give it to him to whom he ſwears, or to ſome other, becauſe theſe words may receive either of theſe two Senſes.

103. If in the Tongue in which you ſwear, the Name of God ſignifies divers things, it will be lawful to ſwear by the Name of *God*, taking it in ſome other ſignification.

104. When one is required to make oath unto a perſon in a caſe in which he believes he is not obliged to ſwear, he may do it without fear of Perjury, though that he ſaith be falſe.

105. If a perſon be ignorant and cannot make uſe of mental reſervation upon occaſion; he may ſwear plainly without obliging himſelf in any ſort whatſoever; provided he hath no intent to ſwear, nor to perform that which he ſwears.

106. This art of Equivocation in the conduct of affairs is of marvellous uſe, and the Jeſuits have given many Rules and Examples for the facilitating of it. If one deſires to borrow money of a man, which indeed he hath, but which indeed he will not lend; he may ſwear he hath it not at all, meaning, not to lend him.

107. It's lawful in our defence at all times to make uſe of Equivocations, though he who examines us, do's preſs us, and makes us ſwear not to uſe them; yet he may ſafely make uſe of them.

108. One is diſcharged of his Oath, though in doing what he ſwears to do, he hath an expreſs intent not to do or fulfill it.

109. It's a leſs ſin to ſwear in common talk by the Holy Name of God, than it's to eat an Egg in *Lent*.

110. If I ſwear to do ſuch an act, and have no intention to ſwear, though I do not perform the act, I am not forſworn, becauſe an Oath depends on the Intention of him who ſwears.

111. If a man lyes in uſing Equivocations, without any neceſſity obliging him thereunto, and ſwears to confirm this Equivocation, he doth neither lie nor commit perjury; becauſe he that ſpeaks and ſwears in that ſort, hath no intention to ſpeak or ſwear falſly.

112. If one commit Perjury through natural inadvertency, or becauſe of ill cuſtom he hath to forſwear, it's no mortal ſin; becauſe he doth forſwear himſelf without perceiving it at all.

CHAP. XII.

Of the Doctrine of Probability.

113. A Probable Opinion is that which hath one good Author, of Reputation, or one Reaſon to maintain it; that which is ſupported by a probable Opinion is ſimply good, and we may lawfully and ſafely in Conſcience act by and according to it.

114. Where two Opinions are probable, the one as well as the other, we may juſtly in the practice prefer that which is leſs probable; though not ſo ſafe, if you like it beſt, or may be acceptable to others.

115. It's lawful in Conſcience for a man to quit his own opinion, though more probable, to follow the probable opinion of another, though leſs ſure.

116. If you meet with two contrary Opinions, you may follow them, both in different affairs, and even in the ſame affair alſo, acting and giving contrary counſels now after the one, and then after the other.

117. A man may hold an opinion probable, when he is perſuaded that he himſelf or ſome other can anſwer the reaſons upon which that Opinion is grounded; and it's ſafe to act in Conſcience accordingly.

118. He who believes that it's more probable, may yet follow it himſelf, if he believes that it's alſo probable, that he may follow it.

119. All probable Opinions are of themſelves as ſafe the one as the other; but the more pleaſant although they be leſs probable, are alwayes more profitable and more ſafe.

CHAP. XIII.

Of Judges and Witneſſes.

120. IF the Right of the Parties ſeem equal on both ſides, the Judge may take Money or a Preſent of one Party, to give the advantage to whether he pleaſeth.

121. If the Opinions are ſo doubtful and divided, that it's in the power of the Judge to follow which he pleaſeth; if one of the Parties make him a Preſent to gain him to his ſide, the Judge doth not offend againſt Juſtice to receive that which is given him.

122. A Judge giving his Judgment may follow a probable Opinion, leaving that which is more probable.

123. If there be two probable Opinions, the Judge may give Sentence according to which he pleaſeth; and one while he may judge according to one opinion, and another time according to another opinion.

124. A perſon who hath born falſe witneſs through ignorance, who occaſioned the loſs of life, after he underſtands the truth, he is not obliged to retract his falſe teſtimony, for fear of expoſing himſelf to puniſhment.

125. It's lawful to kill an innocent perſon, after we have ſlandered him, rather than expoſe our ſelves to danger by retracting.

126. If a man be accuſed of a Crime which cannot be legally proved by the Accuſer; he may not only deny the crimes, but ſlander the Accuſer, and may impoſe ſo many crimes upon him as will be neceſſary for his defence; and he ſinneth not againſt Juſtice.

127. A falſe Witneſs is he who chargeth one with a falſe Crime; but an unjuſt Witneſs is he who accuſeth one of true Crimes, but ſecret, and which he cannot prove.

CHAP. XIV.

Of Reſtitution.

128. IF any man hath by Merchandize, Uſury, or otherwiſe, being invincibly ignorant, gained a great Eſtate; though afterward he be informed of the injuſtice, he is not obliged to reſtitution.

129. There is no natural Precept which obliges us in this life to make ſatisfaction for temporal pains.

130. A Sinner may refer Satisfaction without injuſtice, unto the other life, if he maketh not ſatisfaction in this.

131. A perſon who is indebted in great Sums of Money, and gives away part of his Goods, to the prejudice of his Creditors; he to whom the guift is made, is not obliged to reſtitution.

132. That which one receives for doing of an unjuſt action, as for bearing of falſe witneſs, for killing of a man; he is not ſubject to reſtitution.

133. If a Judge hath taken money to give an unjuſt Judgment, he is not obliged to reſtitution; but if he hath received money to give a juſt Judgment, he is obliged to reſtore what he hath received.

134. If a man wrongeth another out of ignorance or infirmity, he is bound to make reſtitution.

135. Where a man cannot make reſtitution without diminiſhing his retinue or expence, he is not bound to make reſtitution.

136. Where one hath done wrong to another not by violence, but by Promiſes, Prayers or Preſents; he is not obliged to reſtitution.

137. A man is not obliged to reſtore what he hath ſtollen by trivial and inconſiderable Theſts, whatſoever the total Sum may amount unto.

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